the Comptroller has made a specific and independent evaluation, without referring to that determined by the Office of the Determination of Responsibility with respect to the allegations and evidence that led to the declaration of responsibility. Without providing appropriate and autonomous cause, the sanction for disqualification operates almost automatically, by way of a procedural issue that ends up being merely procedural. 148. Finally, the Court has already indicated that Mr. López Mendoza had the opportunity to contest the considerations of the Comptroller through subsequent appeals that rejected the arguments about the magnitude of the administrative failures and the severity of the irregularities (supra para. 118). However, the Court considers that the problems in regard to cause to impose the sanction of disqualification had a negative impact on the right to defense. The lack of cause prevented an in-depth review of the arguments or evidence directly related to the additional sanctions, as is obvious and this case demonstrates, may be significantly more onerous than the principle sanction. Regarding this point, the Court reiterates that the motivation demonstrates to the parties that they have been heard and, in cases where decisions may be appealed, it provides the possibility to contest the resolution and make a new examination of the matter before higher authorities. 245 149. Consequently, the State is responsible for the violation of the obligation to establish motivation and the right to defense in administrative proceedings that resulted in the imposition of sanctions for disqualification set out in Article 8(1), in relation with Article 1(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights, to the detriment of Mr. López Mendoza. 3. Reasonable period 150. The Commission and the representatives argued that the contentiousadministrative remedies for annulment and the constitutional challenge filed by Mr. López Mendoza were not resolved in a reasonable period. 151. The State noted that “the time in which the Supreme Tribunal of Justice […]delayed in resolving the appeals for annulment mentioned […], it adjusted to a reasonable period, considering the complexity of the case; the procedural activity of the interested parties, as well as the actions of the judicial authorities.” 152. Considering the arguments of the parties, the Court notes that the alleged violation of Article 25 of the Convention in the present case involves the following remedies filed by the alleged victim: i) motion to reconsider and a judicial appeal for annulment of the State’s administrative decision regarding the resolutions that declared the administrative responsibility of Mr. López Mendoza for the actions of PDVSA and the Municipality of Chacao and against the subsequent declarations of disqualification from holding public office, and ii) the constitutional challenge against Article 105 of the LOCGRSNCF, together with the precautionary measure for protection of a constitutional right before the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. 245 Cf. Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Court of Administrative Dispute”), supra note 237, para. 78; Case of Tristán Donoso V. Panamá. Preliminary Objection , Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of January 27, 2009 Series C No. 193, para. 153, and Case of Chocrón Chocrón, supra note 13, para. 118. For its part, the Human Rights Committee considered that the absence of a written reasoned judgment of the Court of Appeal is likely to prevent the author from successfully asking for an authorization to appeal before a Superior Court, stopping him from using an additional remedy. United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Hamilton v. Jamaica, Communication No. 333/1988, CCPR/C/50/D/333/1988, March 23, 1994 61