29. Another aspect to consider is the foreseeability of the sanction of disqualification being imposed. The parties presented arguments concerning the temporal period used by the Comptroller to impose additional sanctions, once the administrative responsibility is declared and imposed for the corresponding fine. The Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice, taking into account the general rule on statute of limitations of punitive administrative actions (under Article 114 of the LOCGRSNCF), in the jurisprudence that arose after the facts of this case, has set a maximum term of five years 24 for the sanction of disqualification to be adopted. 30. Mr. Lopez Mendoza disqualification due to the events related to PDVSA occurred approximately five months after the declaration of administrative responsibility was final (para. 204), 25 while the disqualification for the events surrounding the Mayor’s Office of Chacao was imposed about six months after the resolution that established declaration of While the time between the declaration of responsibility was final (para. 204). 26 responsibility and the imposition of the disqualification itself was not excessive, it has been held (para. 205) that the domestic legislation does not establish a fixed period or time for the Comptroller to exercise this power. 31. The decision of the Political-Administrative Chamber, designed to work around this regulatory gap with the statute of limitations of the administrative action, does not meet the standard of foreseeability or legal certainty of the legislation. As was set out in paragraph 205 of the Judgment, the "foreseeability test" involves proving that the legislation clearly delineate the scope of discretion that may be exercised by the authority and define the circumstances in27which it may be exercised in order to establish appropriate safeguards to The uncertainty regarding the period within which it could impose a prevent abuse. restriction on the right to be elected is not compatible with the legal certainty in a sanctioning proceeding that restricts such rights. Furthermore, a period of five years is not reasonable to ensure predictability in the enforcement of the restriction because it is too long a period and, therefore, incompatible with the requirement that a sanctioning proceeding conclude when the appropriate liability is established, in order that the accused does not wait for a long time in the setting of a sanction established as punishment for his 24 Article 114 of the LOCGRSNCF establishes that “[t]he administrative sanctioning or recovery actions derived from this law, are prescribed for a period of 5 (years), unless in special Laws different periods are established. Said term will begin to run as of the date that the events, actions, or ommissions from which administrative responsibility took place, the imposition of fines or reparation; neverthless, when the infractor is a pubic official, the perspcription will begin to run as of the date of cessation of the charge for the period of the occurrence of the irregularity. […]” Judgment No. 01516 of October 20, 2009 (Exp. Nº 2005-5270) issued by the Accidental Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice and judgment No. 00782 of July 27, 2010 (Exp. No. 20080871) issued by the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. Cited in the final written brief of the State (case file on the Merits, tome III, folio 1459). 25 On March 28, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was decided, which finalized the declaration of administrative responsibility for the facts related to PDVSA, and on August 24, 2005, the Comptroller General of the Republic issued Resolution No. 01-00-000206, which imposed the sanction of disqualification for 3 years. 26 On March 28, 2005, the motion for reconsideration was decided, which finalized the declaration of administrative responsibility for the facts related to Chacao Mayor’s Office, and on September 26, 2005, the Comptroller General of the Republic issued the Resolution No. 01-00 -235, which imposed the sanction of disqualification for 6 years. 27 In this regard, the European Court has established that “a law which confers a discretion must indicate the scope of that discretion […]. The degree of precision required of the "law" in this connection will depend upon the particular subject-matter. […] Consequently, the law must indicate the scope of any such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.” ECHR, Case Malone v. The United Kingdom, Judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, para. 67 y Case Olsson v. Sweden, Judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130. para. 61. 7