128. This Court has noted that the principle of presumption of innocence constitutes a foundation of the right to fair trial [judicial guarantees].227 The presumption of innocence implies that the defendant must show that he or she committed the crime attributed to him or her, and that the onus probandi correspond to the accuser.228 Thus, the clear evidence of guilt is a prerequisite for criminal punishment, in such a way that the burden of proof falls on the prosecution and not on the accused.229 Thus, the lack of presentation of convincing evidence of responsibility in a guilty verdict is a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence,230 which is essential for the effective realization of the right to defense and accompanies the accused throughout the trial proceedings until a final judgment is issued that determines guilt.231 On the other hand, the presumption of innocence implies that judges do not initiate the proceeding with a preconceived idea that the defendant committed the crime for which he or she is being charged, as the burden of proof falls on the accuser and any doubt should be used to benefit the accused. The presumption of innocence is violated if, before the accused is found guilty, a court decision renders that he or she is guilty. 232 129. Thus, the Court notes that in the phase of performance of fiscal oversight of the administrative proceeding at hand, (supra para. 38) the respective oversight bodies conduct account assessments, inspections, and audits to determine the alleged facts that could lead to an unlawful administrative action. Thus, the next phase of investigation (supra para. 38) arises only when derived from the previous phase, it is concluded that there is evidence to presume the administrative responsibility of some employees or officials in the exercise of their functions. The results report which concludes this phase also involves the carrying out of proceedings that involve the accused to debate and clarify if it is appropriate to proceed with the proceeding regarding determination of responsibility” that includes a specific phase for objections that extends into the oral or public hearing. (supra para. 39). 130. With regard to questions raised by the representatives regarding the viability of the alleged objective administrative responsibility under the LOCGRSNCF, the Court notes 227 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero V. Ecuador. Merits, supra note 216, para. 77; Case of Chaparro, Álvarez, and Lapo Íñiguez V. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of November 21st of 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 14, and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, supra note 21, para. 182. 228 Case of Ricardo Canese V. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations, and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C No. 111, para. 154 and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, supra note 21, para. 182. 229 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee of the United Nations has noted that, “The presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proving the charge, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.” United Nations. Human Rights Committee. General Comment N° 32, Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial (HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (vol. I)), para. 30. 230 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides V. Perú. Merits. Judgment August 18th of 2000. Series C No. 69, párr.121 and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, supra note 21, para. 183. 231 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese, supra note 228, para. 154 and Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, supra note 21, para. 183 232 Case of Cabrera García and Montiel Flores, supra note 21, para. 184, citing ECHR, Case of Barberà, Messegué, and Jabardo v Spain, Judgment of December 6th of 1988, App. Nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, paras. 77 and 91. 54