but also the collective interest of the voters that is affected. It is not therefore a situation, equal to that of appointed officials, regardless of the path (free appointment or competition). 21. As I have emphasized some lines above, it is fundamental that the State have efficient and effective administrative mechanisms to combat and punish acts of corruption. It is also noteworthy that in this case –wherein Mr. Lopez Mendoza’s hand in a crime was not proven criminally –the “additional” sanction was notoriously more severe than the “principle” sanction (a fine). Particularly when this involves a person, Mr. López Mendoza, who has made his participation in electoral life his life project. The high impact of the sanction in regard to Mr. Lopez Mendoza’s political rights, prevented him from running as a candidate for Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, and eventually, other elective offices. 22. In light of the facts of this case, we must ask if the exercise of the sanctioning power of the administration may affect the right to passive suffrage. In other words, if by way of that forum, a citizen may be prevented from participating as a candidate in an electoral race. I share and agree with that established by the Court in that the exercise of the sanctioning power of the State cannot affect the right to passive suffrage and that this power lies only in the hands of a judicial authority taking into account the scope of the affected right. 23. Nevertheless, from my point of view and going beyond this case, this type of restriction does not need to be exclusively reserved to a criminal court, but rather it may extend to other judicial authorities that has been previously established in the respective legal systems who comply with the obligation to respect and assure the guarantees established to this effect. 24. Regarding the same topic, proportionality, from what is found in the case file, it follows that the conduct attributed to Mr. Lopez Mendoza were not the most severe. The Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the National System of Fiscal Oversight (hereinafter, LOCGRSNCF) established that the amount of18 the fine was determined based on the severity of the fine and the type of detriment. While the State argued that the sanctions were not accumulated and that recidivism existed, the protruding lack of gravity in the conduct being attributed to Mr. Lopez Mendoza is evident in the fact that the fines imposed were not the most severe fines legally available. The fine applied for 19 the “facts of the PDVSA” was of the lowest of the applicable fines. The fine applied in relation to the “facts of the Mayor’s Office” is a fine that ranks at an intermediary level of 20 the applicable fines. 18 Article 94 of the LOCGRSNCF states that those found responsible may be punished "according to the seriousness of the offense and the type of damage caused, with fine[s] of one hundred (100) to [...] one thousand (1,000) tax units to be imposed by supervisory bodies referred to in [the] Law." Organic Law of the Comptroller General of the Republic and the National System of Fiscal Oversight, published in the Official Gazette No. 37.347 on Monday, December 17, 2001 (case file of attachments to the application, appendix 1, page 1419). 19 According to the deciding order of the Office of Determination of Responsibility on October 29, 2004, the fine imposed on Mr. Lopez Mendoza was of one million two hundred forty-two thousand bolivares (Bs, 1,243,200.00), that is, equivalent to 168 tax units (UT). Indeed, according to the order, the value of the current Tax Unit was seven thousand four hundredbolivars (Bs. 7400.00). Cf. Deciding Order of the Office of Determination of Responsibility of the Office of Special Procedures of the Comptroller General of the Republic of October 29, 2004 (case file of annexes to the application, Annex 34, Volume V, pages 2614-2616). 20 According to the deciding order of the Office for the Determination of Responsibility of November 2, 2004, the fine imposed on Mr. Lopez Mendoza was of eight million, one hundred and forty thousand bolivares (Bs. 8,140,000.00), that is, equivalent to 550 tax units (TU). According to that order, the value of the current Tax Unit was fourteen thousand eight hundredbolivars (Bs. 14,800.00). Cf. Deciding Order of November 2, 2004 issued by 5