This implies that the first and second instance of amparo, or habeas corpus, is the
procedural remedy that guarantees the private person the possibility of demanding the
cessation of the violations of his or her constitutional rights, as the Judiciary is obligated
to restore, through this process, the situations infringed by the violations of such rights.
While the review is a completely exceptional mechanism, which only operates when it is
deemed advisable to do so by the justices of the Constitutional Chamber, in the use of
their discretional power of selection.
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies cannot be applied to a procedural
mechanism which, in summary, has the following characteristics:
(a) It is not a remedy or an action available to the victim of human rights violations; it is
a discretional power of the Constitutional Chamber, which may be exercised sua sponte,
or at the request of an interested person, with no term of preclusion.
(b) One who requests the review of an amparo judgment has no right to obtain a
pronouncement as to its admissibility or lawfulness.
(c) The review is not a second appeal (third instance) of an amparo judgment; to the
contrary, review applies to amparo judgments or judgments of constitutional review that
are definitely firm, and that have the authority of res judicata. Hence, it is a mechanism
that is not only special, but exceptional, and it is up to the Constitutional Chamber to
determine, selectively, whether to admit or process the reviews in those cases in which
they deem it pertinent.
15. With the filing of the habeas corpus remedy before the Fifth Circuit Court of Review of the
State of Vargas, on January 28, 2000, which declared on February 1 that there was no subject
matter on which to decide, and the affirmation of this decision on February 10, 2000, by the
Court of Appeals of the Criminal Judicial Circuit of the Judicial District for the State of Vargas,
the petitioners consider that they have exhausted domestic remedies in Venezuela.
16. The petitioners argue that the facts alleged constitute a violation by the Venezuelan State
of several provisions of the American Convention on Human Rights, such as the right to
respect and ensure the rights (Article 1(1)), the right to life (Article 4), the right to humane
treatment (Article 5), the right to personal liberty (Article 7), the rights to a fair trial and to
judicial protection (Articles 8(1) and 25), and Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention on
Forced Disappearance of Persons.
B.
The State
17. The Venezuelan State considers that domestic remedies have not been exhausted, given
that at present actions are being taken and investigations are under way by the Public Ministry
and the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, together with the Venezuelan courts, aimed
at clarifying the events that occurred in the state of Vargas.
18. The criminal courts that had the habeas corpus actions before them requested information
from the security agencies that indicated that they had the persons detained. In all these
cases, both the Ministry of Defense and the National Guard and DISIP reported that the
citizens with respect to whom the writs of habeas corpus were filed were not detained under
their orders.
19. In the face of this information supplied by the security agencies, the criminal courts--both
the Criminal Court of Review and the Criminal Courts of Appeals--were of the view that the
procedural requirements for the habeas corpus action to lie were not met, accordingly, this
was not the adequate means for effectively investigating the facts alleged, as the proper
course of action was to begin a formal, regular investigation, following the guidelines and rules
established in the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure, so as to determine precisely the real
characteristics of the deed, and to identify the perpetrators and participants. Accordingly, the
Senior Prosecutor for the state of Vargas was told to order immediately that the respective
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