2 and, also, insofar as what must be contained in the Judgment according to Article 45 (2) and 45 (3) of the Rules of Procedure, which read as follows: 2. Where the Court finds that there is a breach of the Convention, it shall give in the same judgment a decision on the application of Article 63 (1) of the Convention if that question, after being raised under Article 43 of these Rules, is ready for decision; if the question is not ready for decision, the Court shall decide on the procedure to follow. If, on the other hand, the matter has not been raised under Article 43, the Court shall determine the period within which it may be presented by a party or by the Commission. 3. If the Court is informed that an agreement has been reached between the victim of the violation and the State Party concerned, it shall verify the equitable nature of such agreement. 6. In those Separate Opinions, I also explained my position regarding the procedural relationship of the parties, that is, not as beneficiary and debtor, but rather as plaintiff and respondent in the proceeding, as follows: 40. . . . there is no valid reason to refuse to the victims, the substantial "active party," their independent condition of "active party" in the proceedings. . . . in my judgment, the Convention only bars the individual from submitting a case to the Court (Art. 61 (1)). This limitation, as such, is, in the light of the principles, a "repugnant matter" (materia odiosa) and should thus be interpreted restrictively. Therefore, one cannot draw from that limitation the conclusion that the individual is also barred from his autonomous condition of "party" in the procedures once they have begun . . . . (A)s concerns the Inter-American Commission, which must appear in all cases before the Court . . . this is clearly a sui generis role, purely procedural, as an auxiliary of the judiciary, like that of a "Ministerio Público" of the inter-American system for the protection of human rights (Decision of September 8, 1983). As I have recognizes participate procedural said (supra 1), the foregoing forces me to dissent to paragraph 192, insofar as it the Commission as the sole procedural party other than the State or States that in a case before the Court, without recognizing the legal standing, even in a purely sense, of the victims or their assignees, among others. 7. In addition, I believe that if the Convention and the Rules of the Commission and the Court generally authorize a friendly settlement both before and after the case is brought to the Court, and this process is always controlled directly by the victim with only the mediation or oversight of the Commission, it makes no sense to authorize a direct agreement after the Court has ordered, in the abstract, the payment of an indemnization, naming the Commission as the only party to deal with the State concerned rather that the assignees of Manfredo Velásquez to whom the indemnization is owed. The following provisions are self-explanatory: Convention Article 48 1. When the Commission receives a petition or communication alleging violation of any of the rights protected by this Convention, . . .