the order to prosecute him was issued, he was never advised “in what capacity he had been summoned to appear before the court or made to appear accompanied by defense counsel, even though, at that time, procedural steps were being taken to investigate him.” 192. The State, when contesting the alleged “selective application” of the Counter-terrorism Act, affirmed that “to acknowledged an error, ex post, in a judgment, or in the application of a procedural norm does not signify assigning to this error a certain hidden motivation shared not only by the person who has committed the error (a judge, prosecutor or lawyer) but by all the powers of the State.” It also indicated that “[i] has been sought to assert, based on the judgments handed down in these cases and their negative impact on those who were directly prejudiced by them – natural and to be expected for anyone who is a victim of a judicial or administrative error – that the State of Chile has incurred in the said errors (if they exist) in a voluntary and planned manner.” It affirmed that “[n]o State apparatus exists that is focused on repressing and convicting members of the Mapuche communities under the Counter-terrorism Act, in order to criminalize and stifle their ancestral claims,” and that “[i]f this was true, each time that the organs responsible for criminal prosecution open proceedings under this law, the accused would be convicted,” which was not the case. It affirmed that “seeking social peace, the Ministry [of the Interior and Public Safety] has ceased to prosecute acts of violence committed in the area of Araucanía as terrorist offenses.” It maintained that “confronted with acts that have the characteristics of ordinary offenses or offenses under the Counter-terrorism Act […], whether committed by members of Mapuche communes or any other citizen, it is not feasible to require the State […] not to file criminal proceedings based on the argument that such acts could be inspired by an ‘ancestral claim.’” It indicated that this law is not “an antiMapuche law” and that, “therefore, [t]he reasons for applying it do not respond to a desire to prosecute or to prejudice a specific group of the population, but to the conviction of the criminal prosecutor” that the characteristics of the acts indicate a terrorist intent. The State did not submit arguments on the alleged violation of the right to an impartial judge or court. 2. Considerations of the Court 193. The impartiality of the courts that intervened in the different cases has been questioned by two types or arguments. The first refers exclusively to the proceedings against Víctor Manuel Ancalaf Llaupe, the only one in which the former 1906 Code of Criminal Procedure was applied. The Court does not find it necessary to make a special ruling on these arguments and those relating to Article 8(2)(c), 8(2)(d) and 8(5) (supra para. 191.b), but will take them into account, as pertinent, when ruling on the right to defend oneself (Article 8(2)(f) of the Convention) (infra paras. 253 to 260) and on the alleged violation of personal liberty in relation to the pre-trial detention to which Mr. Ancalaf Llaupe was subjected (Article 7 of the Convention) (infra paras. 313 to 327). 194. The second group of arguments relates to the alleged discrimination based on ethnic origin against the presumed victims, either because of the supposed existence of a “selective application of the Counter-terrorism Act” against members of the Mapuche indigenous people, or because the domestic criminal judgments contain statements that are considered to constitute or to reveal discrimination of the type indicated. 195. In order to decide the disputes in this regard, the Court will structure its considerations in the following order:: a) General considerations: i. The principle of equality and non-discrimination and the right to equal protection of the law; ii. The right to an impartial judge or court; b) Application to this case: 68