FIDH considered that the right to appeal a judgment had been violated “because the real possibility of a complete review of the facts did not exist.” It referred to the grounds for nullity established in article 374.e of the Criminal Procedural Code, indicating that even though “[s]ome authors of legal doctrine” affirm that these grounds allow the existence of errors in the reception or assessment of evidence to be evaluated and, consequently, could meet the obligations of Article 8(2)(h), “practice reveals the contrary.” It stated that, even when this norm is usually used “to expand the scope of the appeal for annulment of a judgment of an oral criminal court, this does not provide grounds for a review of the facts,” and that “serious legal uncertainty” exists as to its scope. The FIDH asserted that the judgment delivered by the Temuco Court of Appeal, denying the appeals for annulment filed by each of those convicted, failed to make a comprehensive review of the judgments convicting them because: in response to the complaint of omission and improper assessment of the evidence based on the cause for nullity of the said article 374.e, it made “a formal analysis of the judgment,” and an interpretation in order to clarify and give “legal validity” to the terms in which the oral trial court had rejected certain evidence that the defense considered to be exculpatory, and failed to rule on the complaint relating to the violation “of the equality of the parties” in relation to the application of criteria for the assessment of evidence. 265. CEJIL did not allege the violation of Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. 266. The State asserted that the appeal system under the Criminal Procedural Code “is in line” with Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention and affirmed that the appeal for annulment is only one of the mechanisms to avoid judicial error.289 It indicated that the Convention recognizes those criminal procedural systems “of an accusatory nature, based on the principles of orality, immediacy and concentration, inter alia, where deciding the case in a single instance is an essential element of the model” and that “the right to a remedy” does not mean an “appeal” in which both the facts and the law are examined. It pointed out that the grounds for the appeal for annulment allow a comprehensive review “that includes both the legal and factual merits of the judgment,” which “supposes an analysis of both the proven facts and the reasons why those facts were considered true; in other words, a control of the assessment of the evidence.” It maintained that the grounds included in article 374.e of the Criminal Procedural Code permit, “[i]n practice, the review of factual issues.” It indicated that, even if it is considered that the judgments denying the appeals for annulment filed by the presumed victims “contained insufficient reasoning,” the evolution of domestic case law on the grounds included in article 374.e “opens the way for the appeal for annulment to allow a higher court to review the facts […] by examining [the] reasoning behind the ruling” and cited extracts from judgments of 2009, 2012 and 2013 to justify this statement. Regarding the ruling issued by the Temuco Court of Appeal on October 13, 2004, it asserted that “the reasoning of the review may indeed appear inadequate,” but that “even though the [said] ruling can be questioned, this cannot be a reason for requesting the legal amendment of the remedy.” 2. Considerations of the Court 267. The dispute on the alleged violation of Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention refers, fundamentally, to the effectiveness of the appeal for declaration of nullity. The examination of this issue will be divided into three parts: (a) scope and content of the right to appeal the judgment; (b) appeal system established in the Criminal Procedural Code of Chile, and (c) analysis of the judgments denying the appeals for annulment in light of Article 8(2)(h) of the Convention. 289 It also referred to the oral trial, to the collegiate composition of the oral criminal court, and to the adoption of the standard that the court must be convinced “beyond all reasonable doubt.” 92