110. The investigation of the attack on the Embassy was in charge of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. By the date of the AMIA attack, the Argentine judicial authorities had not yet issued any resolution of merit on the attack on the Israeli Embassy. Through the resolution of December 23, 1999, the act was attributed "to the terrorist group called Islamic Jihad, the armed wing of Hezbollah”74. To date, there is no information that indicates that there are people convicted for the act. 111. After the attack on the Israeli Embassy, a 24-hour surveillance service was set up to guard the street where the AMIA building was located, which was in charge of the 5th and 7th police stations of the Argentine Federal Police75. Some of the custody measures consisted of taking photographs of the vicinity of the building, observations or filming, prohibiting parking on Pasteur street at 600 and avoiding, as far as possible, that the cars stopped in the vicinity of the building. The policemen were rotated by quarters, so that two uniformed men were always present. In addition, there was a control and supervision service in charge of the external officer of the two police stations to control and record any irregularities76. 112. Days before the attack on the AMIA building, the Brazilian citizen Wilson Roberto Dos Santos went to the Argentine consulate in Milan, Italy, and informed the consul Norma Fasano about the identity of a woman whom he considered strange and who, in his opinion had a false Argentine passport and identity card. Dos Santos indicated that he told the consul that the woman he was referring to had participated in the attack on the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires77. Dos Santos stated that after the attack on the AMIA he went again to Consul Fasano to insist on his suspicions of the participation of a person in the attacks on the Embassy and the AMIA, to which she would have responded that "the basis of his suspicions, that is, the illegality of the Argentine documentation […], were not sufficient to initiate an investigation”78. 113. In the last hours of July 17, 1994, and in the early morning hours of the following day, several people observed and heard a helicopter fly low over the AMIA building 79. The aeronautical authority had no record of it80. 114. Specifically in relation to the custody of the place before the AMIA attack, the TOF 3 found that from the testimonies received it emerged that “that at least from Friday the 15th until the morning of the following Monday, the patrol car stationed on the street Pasteur was not working because its battery had no charge. For that reason, the custody did not have, in those days, the communications equipment installed in the police car; this deficiency was addressed, according to the statements of several of the above-mentioned police officers, by using a manual communication device - "H.T." - provided by those in charge of the internal custody of the mutual”81. 115. According to what was stated in the “Grossman Report”, it is stated that in the investigatory phase carried out by Judge Galeano it is mentioned that three minutes before the attack a truck left a tipper vehicle in front of the AMIA, near the place where the car bomb would later explode. However, the judge did not believe that the explosives had been there, and the Court reached the same conclusion82. According to the Grossman Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation. Press Release "Report on the status of the case concerning the bombing of the Israeli Embassy." March 4, 2015. 75 In this regard, the TOF 3 ruling explains “The demarcation between the jurisdictions of the 5th and 7th police stations was p recisely Pasteur street, spanning from the building line towards the end of the first, while the street and the sidewalk were in the orbit of the second. For this reason, the mobile team was made up of police officers from both units; the driver of the mobile unit belonged to the 7th police station while the non-commissioned officer in charge of the unit was assigned to the other unit”. Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter V.A. p. 2358. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 76 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter V.A. p. 2359. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 77 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter XIV. Page 4593. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 78 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter XIV. Page 4593. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 79 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter VI, p. 2642. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 80 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter VI, p. 2648. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 81 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter V.A. p. 2360 and 2361. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 82 Annex 1. Grossman Report. P. 3. Annex 5 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 74 22