Report, the initial investigators of the case assumed that the AMIA was targeted because it was the scene of demonstrations in favor of the State of Israel83. 116. According to the petitioners, after the attack on the Israeli Embassy and prior to the AMIA attack, the SIDE was carrying out monitoring and intelligence tasks that targeted Moshen Rabanni, cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy in Argentina, who would have been observed in 1993 while touring various car dealerships84. The petitioners also pointed out that the telephones of the Iranian Embassy would be tapped 45 days before the attack on the AMIA, but that the content of these wiretaps was lost 85. 2. Considerations of the Commission in relation to the rights to life and humane treatment in this case 117. The attack on the AMIA headquarters left 85 people dead and 151 injured. As has been indicated, there is no single definition of terrorist violence and it is not for the IACHR to determine the motives as it would be done in a criminal investigation. However, in order to determine the legal consequences it has on the obligations of the Argentine State in light of international law, based on the proven facts and the aforementioned international instruments, the Commission considers it necessary to affirm that the attack that is the subject of this case constitutes a terrorist act. The above, taking into account fundamentally the following factors: it is a violent action, which caused the death and injuries of dozens of people, led to a state of terror and panic in the population due to the method and violence used, created a threat to peace and security in Argentine society and the Argentine Jewish community, and it was also aimed at causing harm to an identity group such as the Argentine Jewish community. 118. In the specific case, the Commission observes that the participation of State agents in the actions that caused the damage to the right to life and humane treatment has not been proven. However, as has been indicated, a State may be responsible for the lack of due diligence in not adopting measures that prevent human rights violations committed between individuals within its jurisdiction. 119. To analyze compliance with the aforementioned obligation, the Commission recalls that, although the States are not responsible for every terrorist act in their jurisdiction, perpetrated by third parties, a State may be responsible when: i) it had or should have knowledge of a risk situation; ii) said risk situation was real and immediate; and iii) it did not adopt the measures that were reasonably expected to prevent said risk from occurring. Next, the Commission will analyze whether these assumptions are met in the specific case. 120. Regarding whether the State had or should have knowledge of a risk situation, the Commission observes that the attack on the AMIA headquarters was the second terrorist act directed against the Jewish community in Argentina. Its background is the attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992, which took the lives of 22 people and injured 350. This attack was engraved in the memory of Argentine society, due to the type of violence used, the effects caused on the people who suffered the attack and the objective that clearly emerges from it to generate terror. The seriousness of the attack on the Israeli Embassy in 1992, taking into account its characterization as a terrorist act, reasonably generated a situation of risk for this community and for the people who had some relationship with it, which was and should be known by the State. In effect, the specificity and magnitude of the attack involved in a terrorist attack of these characteristics represents a situation of risk for the people or communities to whom it was directed or related to. This risk situation extended to the congregation places of the Jewish community, specifically one of them being the AMIA and DAIA building. In the present case, it is evidenced that the State specifically identified and learned of this risk situation because it effectively ordered the Federal Police to guard the building located on Pasteur Street permanently, 24 hours a day. 121. As to whether said risk was real and immediate, the Commission observes that, at the time of the AMIA attack, there was no judicial decision that would have determined the truth of what happened in the attack on the Israeli Embassy and punished those responsible. The Commission highlights that the occurrence of an Annex 1. Grossman Report. P. 3. Annex 5 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. Petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. Page 105. 85 Petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. Page 105. 83 84 23