attack such as the one that occurred against the Embassy, necessarily involved a series of actors or networks that participate in its planning and execution. In this sense, the absence of a dismantling and punishment of those responsible, kept a latent situation of insecurity conducive to a new attack. Furthermore, the Commission notes that two warning events occurred in the days prior to the attack, which demonstrate the immediacy of the risk, namely, the statements of the Brazilian citizen Wilson Dos Santos to the Argentine consul in Milan and the overflight of a helicopter to the building of the AMIA, both of which occurred days or moments prior to the 1994 attack. 122. In relation to the statements of the Brazilian citizen Wilson Dos Santos, the Commission observes that he came forward to provide information on the attack on the Israeli Embassy and called attention to the presence of a suspicious person. In addition, Dos Santos' statements reveal a real risk because they refer to a person who would not have legal documentation and who could be involved with extremely serious acts, who would be free and could continue in criminal activities similar to the attack on the Embassy. 123. Regarding the activity of the helicopter flying at a low altitude over the AMIA building on the night of July 17, 1994, the Commission finds that this fact denoted actuality and immediacy of particular situations that deserved special attention for a place on which a general risk situation hangs. If the State knew that the building had to be guarded, and had even arranged measures to do so and to control ground traffic, it had to monitor whether there was a helicopter flying over the place. 124. Regarding whether the State adopted the measures that were reasonably expected to prevent said risk from occurring, the Commission emphasizes that the State was aware of the general risk for the Jewish community in Argentina and its buildings, however, there is no record that measures were adopted aimed at deconstructing possible terrorist plans after the attack on the Israeli Embassy, adequate security measures to protect the AMIA building, nor did it have an adequate response to the information that suggested that an attack could take place. 125. In effect, with regard to the more general preventive measures that the State had, the Commission wishes to highlight that acts of terrorism generate human rights violations that must be addressed by the State, for their investigation, but also to avoid its repetition. In the words of the United Nations Special Rapporteur “the duty of the State to defend national security and its obligation to ensure the protection of the human rights of those under its jurisdiction constitute a series of complementary, simultaneous, and mutually reinforcing obligations” 86. For this reason, States must undertake comprehensive strategies, not only to avoid the creation of terrorist groups, but also to deactivate their action plans when they have already been created. The Commission notes with concern that the State did not provide information on state strategies to combat terrorism after the attack on the Israeli Embassy, which included measures such as the deployment of international cooperation activities to obtain intelligence information, document and border control, or greater control and surveillance of explosive materials. 126. On the contrary, the information available to the IACHR indicates that such measures were not carried out. Indeed, the TOF 3 ruling indicates that the then Minister of the Interior Carlos Federico Ruckauf and Brigadier Andrés Arnoldo Antonietti, head of the Secretariat for Internal Security and Community Protection, denied knowing about prevention policies after the 1992 attack87. In addition, when collecting testimonies from other officials, the same Court found it proven that no preventive measures were adopted, nor were agencies created for it, thus: “although the country had the tragic background of the attack on the Israeli Embassy, on March 17, 1992, almost all of the security officials who deposed in the debate agreed that after said event, no measures were taken to prevent future terrorist attacks or to create organizations dully prepared to collaborate in acts of this nature, the objectives set forth in Law No. 24.059 having remained as a mere expression of wishes”88. United Nations. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms whi le countering terrorism, Ben Emmerson. Framework principles for ensuring the human rights of victims of terrorism*. June 4, 2012 . A/HRC/20/14, para. 18. 87 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter XV, p. 4599. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 88 Annex 2. Judgment of the TOF 3. Chapter XV, p. 4598. Annex 1 to the petitioner’s communication dated November 11, 2019. 86 24