3 they were not notified. The petitioners added that an appeal was filed with the Judicial Career Council, which, in the case of Tirza Flores, confirmed the decision to dismiss with respect to all but one of the charges; in the case of Adán Guillermo López Lone, the Council confirmed the dismissal; in the case of Luís Chévez, the Council declared his petition “well founded”, but indicated that it was neither advisable nor possible to reinstate him to his seat on the bench; in the case of Ramón Barrios, the Council declared his petition “well founded” and ordered that he remain on the bench. 11. The petitioners argued that the State violated the right to personal liberty, since it had not properly investigated Luís Chévez’ arbitrary detention. They argued that while the judge regained his freedom thanks to a petition of habeas corpus, the police had engaged in criminal behavior, yet no investigation has thus far been conducted. The petitioners further maintained that the State violated the right to a fair trial because the guarantees of independence and impartiality were not observed during the disciplinary proceedings. They mentioned that the disciplinary process was flawed with a number of contradictions and gaps that made it unclear who the competent authority was, thereby obstructing the alleged victims’ right of defense. The following were among the arguments put forward: the manner of appointment of justices on the SCJ; the absence of a judicial career service that ensures judges’ tenure and irremovability; the affinity between the justices of the Supreme Court and the persons who took power as a result of the coup d’état; the lack of impartiality, as the position of the alleged victims with respect to the coup d’état was not as it was publicly depicted by the SCJ; the fact that the decision did not set forth the its legal grounds, and the lack of analysis regarding the applicable disciplinary sanction and its proportionality. 12. Regarding the right to judicial protection, the petitioners argued that the appeals filed against the decisions that admitted the evidence were taken up by the Judicial Career Council, which declared them out of order without giving a properly explanation. As for the appeals filed to challenge the dismissals, the petitioners claimed that the Judicial Career Council was not the competent authority and was not independent, as it was subordinate to the SCJ, the very court that had ruled in favor of the judges’ dismissal. The Council, they pointed out, is made up of five members, two of whom are justices on the SCJ; the rest are discretionary appointments. They added that the applicable law provides that decisions of the Judicial Career Council are not subject to appeal and observed that in any event, the petition seeking amparo relief would be ineffective since it would be decided by the SCJ’s own Constitutional Chamber. They further indicated that the practice of challenging a judge would not remedy the situation since the applicable suppletive rules provide that challenges would be heard by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court or Chair of the Chamber. 13. The petitioners asserted that the State violated the right to freedom of expression and the right of assembly because the conducts in which the judges engaged were not punishable offenses under the law. They argued that judges do not, by virtue of the functions they perform, forfeit their right to express their views. Their contention was that the subsequent imposition of liability for exercise of this right should be clearly spelled out in the law, and be calculated to accomplish a legitimate purpose and be necessary in a democratic society. They added that most of the laws applied “are broad and ambiguous” and allow “arbitrary interpretations” that also violate the principle of freedom from ex post facto laws. The petitioners asserted that the use of sanctions served no legitimate end; instead it was used as a means to enable the court authorities to avoid having to raise questions about the SCJ’s role in the coup d’état, and to send a threatening message to judges. They added that the sanctions were unnecessary in a democratic society because “the practice of freedom of expression was vital and necessary for democracy.” They also argued that the disciplinary proceedings were themselves an indirect means of restricting freedom of expression and that the proceeding instituted against Adán