IV. VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT TO WORK 21. This judgment for the first time addresses violation of the right to work in the case of a judge dismissed arbitrarily from a judicial post, as in the case of Mr. Aguinaga Aillón. It thus joins the jurisprudential arena of protection of labor rights, first addressed by the Court in the case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru. 19 The judgment reiterates that the right to work is protected under Article 26 of the Convention and that this protection includes employment stability. 20 The Court recalls in the judgment that job stability is a right that grants worker protection, meaning that employment may be terminated only on justified grounds, such that “employers must demonstrate sufficient cause with all due guarantees, and the worker should be able to challenge the decision before domestic authorities who should verify whether the stated grounds are arbitrary or unlawful.” 21 22. When judges serve within the justice system, they are entitled to job stability as an essential, reinforced condition for independence in the discharge of their duties. This standard is important for two reasons. First, it reaffirms the precepts developed in the case of Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay, 22 in which the independence of prosecutors to perform their duties is linked to protection of job stability. Second, and along the same lines, it holds that the dismissal of a judge via an arbitrary procedure is a violation of the right to work. 23. This view amounts to a recognition of the specific nature of labor rights applicable to public servants, including those who hold high positions. The declaration that Mr. Aguinaga Aillón’s right to job stability had been violated because his dismissal was so patently arbitrary is therefore a contribution to inter-American case law and shows how the different human rights protected by the American Convention are closely interwoven. 24. As we explained in another recent case, 23 the comprehensive, overall dimension of rights that derive from the American Convention calls for an analysis of the facts through the lens of simultaneous applicability of all the relevant articles, on the assumption that the most appropriate hermeneutics of the American Convention view the text in its entirety, and thus, claiming one human right can never impair the others. In that earlier opinion, we distinguished among the different spheres of protection of these rights and held that job stability from the perspective of Article 23(1)(c) of the Convention is grounded in the very fact of being a public officer, while job stability from the perspective Article 26 is based on the essence of “being a worker,” regardless of whether the person works in the public or private sector. A public officer is clearly a worker, but not every worker is a public officer. This is why we uphold dual protection, based on both Article 23(1)(c) (right to public service) and Article 26 (right to work) in the case of workers in the exercise of public service who are affected by arbitrary dismissal. 19 Cf. Case of Lagos del Campo v Peru. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2017. Series C No. 340, para. 143. 20 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 97. 21 Cf. Case of Aguinaga Aillón v. Ecuador, supra, para. 99. 22 Cf. Case of Nissen Pessolani v. Paraguay supra, para. 103. Cf. Joint separate opinion by Judge Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor Poisot and Judge Rodrigo Mudrovitsch in the case of Benites Cabrera et al. v. Peru, supra, paras. 7 and 33. 23 7