PARTIALLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE ROBERTO DE FIGUEIREDO CALDAS INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS CASE OF GRANIER ET AL. (RADIO CARACAS TELEVISIÓN) V. VENEZUELA JUDGMENT OF JUNE 22, 2015 (Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs) I. Introduction 1. The purpose of this opinion, which partially dissents from some of the specific grounds and conclusions indicated in this judgment by the majority of the judges of this Inter-American Court, is to clarify and emphasize aspects which I consider extremely important, not only for the understanding of this case, but also for the historic development of the Court’s case law on freedom of thought and expression and of the press, and the necessary respect for the democratic rule of law, especially in extreme situations as in this case, when there has been a coup d’état. In the instant case, it is important to analyze the consequences and the appropriate legal evaluation that the Court can and should give to this serious political phenomenon of an attack on representative democracy. 2. First, it is important to stress that I have added my vote to the majority, or to the unanimous vote depending on the specific point, to find the Venezuelan State responsible for the violation of the freedom of expression of those victims who were recognized as such (paragraphs 197 to 199), and also for the violation of freedom of expression in its collective dimension of the social right to receive information; for violation of due process of law (paragraph 253), and for disregarding for its own domestic laws in relation to the procedure for the transformation of titles and for the renewal of the concession; for violation of a reasonable time in numerous aspects of the administrative and judicial proceedings, and for violation of the right to a simple and prompt remedy. The grounds for these aspects have already been described appropriately in the judgment that I helped draft. 3. Although it refers to two common general concepts that are substantive in the judgment, the purpose of this opinion is more exactly to provide the grounds for the parts with which I dissent. Initially, I will describe my partial dissent with regard to the differentiation of the petitioners in relation to the request to re-establish the concession of the electromagnetic spectrum to RCTV, which led me to admit the first objection of this Court’s lack of jurisdiction to protect legal persons. Then, I will elaborate on the interrelationship between freedom of the press and freedom of expression and the role of the State in guaranteeing the satisfactory exercise of these freedoms. In sum, I will present these and other aspects that I consider relevant in the decision on the return of the RCTV concession. II. Admission of the preliminary objection of lack of jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court to protect legal persons 4. First, it is necessary to differentiate between the rights of physical persons and company rights – rights of legal persons – understanding that the judgment could not provide direct protection to the rights of a third party; that is, of RCTV in its capacity as a legal person, and not a petitioner in this case. Also, although agreeing with the possible protection of the human rights of a physical person violated by harm to a legal person to which he is connected, this is not the case of some of the claims made, such as the restoration of the RCTV concession and the return of its assets for the use of the electromagnetic spectrum.