5 would be that this absence of separation and/or independence of the branches of government, signifies that the State concerned is not, strictly speaking, fully democratic; in other words, that it is violating the Inter-American Democratic Charter and the treaties it interprets. 2. Regarding the independence of the Judiciary in the State, it should be recalled that the Court referred to this recently in the case of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, in which it indicated: “in 2010, 56% of the Judiciary’s judges were provisional and temporary according to a statement by the SCJ President and, at the time of the facts of this case, this figure was 80%. In addition to creating impediments to judicial independence, this is particularly relevant because Venezuela does not offer such judges the guarantee of tenure required by the principle of judicial independence. In addition, the Court observes that provisional and temporary judges are appointed discretionally by the State; in other words, without competitive examinations, and many of them have been made permanent through the “Special Program to Regularize Permanence (PET).” This means that the respective posts have been filled without allowing individuals who are not part of the Judiciary to compete with the provisional judges to accede to these posts. As indicated in the Reverón Trujillo case, even though evaluations of suitability have been made under the PET, this procedure grants job security to those who were initially appointed on an entirely discretionary basis.”22 3. Thus, the short time that passed between the date on which the facts of that case occurred and those of the instant case and, hence, little change in the context in which they took place, allow us to consider that the lack of independence of the Judiciary in Venezuela that was verified at that time is a well-known public fact. Accordingly, it should perhaps have been developed in the petition and other submissions by the petitioners and, in consequence, allowed the judgment to do so also. 23 C. Freedom of thought and expression. 1. Evidently, the litis in the instant case related fundamentally, although not exclusively, to whether the decision of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela24 not to renew the license of Radio Caracas Televisión violated the provisions of the Convention with regard to freedom of thought and expression. Even more specifically, the dispute revolved around determining whether the non-renewal of the said license constituted an indirect means of restricting or rendering illusory the right to freedom of expression of the victims in this case.25 2. And, it is precisely because the dispute relates to freedom of thought and expression and considering the provisions of Article 63(1) of the Convention26 that, having verified that this right had been violated, it was appropriate in order to reCase of Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of July 1, 2011. Series C No. 227, para. 110. 22 23 Para. 305 of the judgment. 24 Hereinafter, “the State.” Art. 13(3) of the Convention: “The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any other means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and opinions.” Paras. 161 to 164 of the judgment. 25 “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party”. 26