3 discrimination (paras. 97-101 and 110-111). I issued an extensive Concurring Opinion on this significant progress made in the Court´s case law (paras. 1-89). In the instant case of Baldeón-García v. Peru, the Court could –and should- have made progress, but it did not; the Court acknowledged the violations of Articles 4(1) and 5(1) and (2) of the Convention (operative paragraphs No. 2-4 of this Judgment), but at the same time, -and unanimously, as in the recent case of Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (2006)– of Articles 8(1) and 25, considered as a whole, all of them relating to Article 1(1) of the Convention. 8. On this last aspect (operating paragraph no. 5), in this Judgment the Court found that: “(…) Based on the above, the Court considers that no effective remedy was available to guarantee, within a reasonable time, the right, to fair trial to the next of kin of Mr. Baldeón-García in compliance with legal safeguards” (para. 155). This obiter dictum of the Court undoubtedly reflects its unanimous understanding of the close and inevitable relation between Articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention. 9. In my opinion, the right to fair trial is also part of the realm of the international jus cogens. As I explained in my Separate Opinion on the recent case of Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia (Judgment of January 31, 2006): "The impossibility to segregate Article 25 from Article 8, both of the American Convention (…), involves the need to consider the right to fair trial, understood as full access to justice, as part of the realm of the jus cogens, i.e. the intangibility of all legal safeguards belong to the realm of the jus cogens as set forth in Articles 25 and 8, considered as a whole. There is no doubt that the fundamental safeguards, common to the International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, are universal in nature since they are applicable in any and all circumstances, they embody compulsory laws (as part of the jus cogens), and purport erga omnes obligations to protect. After that landmark Advisory Opinion no. 18, on the Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants of 2003, the Court could -and should- have made qualitative progress on precedent setting. I dare nurse the hope that the Court will do so as soon as possible if it effectively continues supporting its avant-garde precedents, -instead of attempting to limit them- and will courageously further on the progress made based on the aforementioned Advisory Opinion no. 18 aimed at continuously broadening the material scope of the jus cogens" (paras. 64-65). 10. Also in my recent Separate Opinion (paras. 52-55) in the case of LópezÁlvarez v. Honduras (Judgment of February 01, 2006), I restated my idea that the right to justice (the right to fair trial lato sensu) is a compulsory element of the jus cogens. The Court could –and should- have established so in the instant case; instead, it repeated prior obiter dicta. Thus, the Court lost the opportunity to step forward regarding its precedent setting process. 11. I will go even further. In my opinion, as I explained above, we are referring to compulsory laws; therefore, the State's obligations to prevent, investigate and punish perpetrators are not mere obligations "to act in a given manner, but not to achieve a given result," as stated by the Court in paragraph 93 of this Judgment. I dissent in this reasoning from the majority of the Court. 12. As I indicated in my Separate Opinion (para. 23) in the recent Judgment of the Court of March 29, 2006, in the city of Brasilia, in the case of Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay: