paragraph of the Judgment and has done so, however, without issuing a separate opinion on them. Consequently, and pursuant to the provision of Article 65(2) of the Rules of Procedure that, if a separate concurring or dissenting opinion is issued, it should include the reasoning; then, to the contrary, if no separate opinion is issued, there is no obligation to provide the reasons for the positive or negative vote. Thus, considering that this opinion relates solely and exclusively to the operative paragraph adopted in the Judgment with regard to the said preliminary objection, the undersigned is not obliged to explain the reasons why he voted negatively with regard to the other paragraphs of the Judgment; namely, the operative paragraphs. By adopting this course of action, the undersigned has proceeded in keeping with the principles of liberty and independence that should govern the actions of a judge, guaranteed by the Convention and the Court’s Statute and Rules of Procedure, which impose no restriction as regards the reason he considers it appropriate to vote according to his conscience or, in particular, by not prohibiting him from explaining, if he so wishes, why he has proceeded in this way. In addition, it should be borne in mind that this opinion is consistent; moreover, it diverges from the approach taken in the Judgment which simultaneously decided the preliminary objection and the merits of the matter, without first making a formal determination of whether the objection related to the merits and, if it considered that this connection existed, deciding to deal with both matters together. Conversely, the present opinion is based on the fact that the preliminary objection filed by the State regarding failure to comply with the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies is not related to the merits of the case and, consequently, was essentially a preliminary matter that, as such, deserved to be decided before and separately from the merits, so that it could not be considered that the decision on the objection might be influenced, even indirectly, by the merits. The reasons why the undersigned does not agree with the decision taken in this case concerning the objection filed by the State based on failure to exhaust domestic remedies are explained below, taking into account the applicable provision of the Convention, the facts of the case as they relate to this provision and, lastly, the part of the Judgment that refers to this objection. I. PROVISION OF THE CONVENTION CONCERNING THE RULE OF PRIOR EXHAUSTION OF DOMESTIC REMEDIES In the first part of this opinion, the undersigned will reiterate and complement some of the general comments made above8 on the said rule and the procedure that should be followed in this regard; in other words, with regard to the petition, its study and initial processing by the Commission, the State’s response to the petition, its admissibility, and the ruling that corresponds to the Court, to conclude with the consequences of considering the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies to be a requirement of admissibility rather than of the petition. opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Díaz Peña v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 26, 2012. Series C No. 244. 8 Dissenting opinion of Judge Eduardo Vio Grossi, Case of Cruz Sánchez et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of April 17, 2015. Series C No. 292. 2