SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ
CONCERNING THE JUDGMENT OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
OF JUNE 29, 2006,
IN THE CASE OF THE ITUANGO MASSACRES
1.
ACCEPTANCE OF FACTS AND CLAIMS, AND THE JUDGMENT OF
THE COURT
1.
On different occasions, I have referred to certain acts that take place during
the international proceedings – specifically, during the judicial proceedings before the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights – that have substantive and procedural
relevance and, consequently, a direct impact on the progress of the proceedings, the
decision on the facts (initially) in dispute, and the determination of the
consequences. I am alluding to the confession, acquiescence, acknowledgement of
responsibility or acceptance of the charges, each with its own juridical nature (not
always delimited when such acts occur), even though they are frequently used as
synonymous concepts. Essentially, they reveal the State’s willingness to
acknowledge its international responsibility for the facts attributed to it and, in a
more limited sense, the juridical consequences.
2.
In other types of proceedings, the confession of the facts and the acceptance
of the claims would end the dispute; accordingly, it would exclude the arguments of
the counterpart, the burden of proving what has been accepted – which therefore
goes unquestioned – the description of the criminal facts, and the reassertion of the
offenses committed. Thus, if a debtor acknowledges that he owes a debt in terms
that are agreeable to the creditor, there is no point receiving evidence on the debt
that has been recognized and describing how it was acquired and the failure to pay
it.
3.
This rule, which evidently simplifies and abbreviates the proceedings, cannot
be used just as it is in proceedings on the violation of human rights. The latter deal
with matters that are subject to the willingness of the parties – particularly the
parties as possessors of substantive rights and obligations; but also entail issues
external to this, which must be considered and resolved by the judicial authority
responsible for the interpretation and application of the American Convention and the
final decision concerning the State’s observance of its international obligations, in
light of the rights and freedoms established therein.
4.
In its decisions on this matter, the Inter-American Court has paid attention
to the logic of the human rights proceedings, which can have different purposes (reestablishment of the legal order, restoration of the peace on which social relations
are based, preservation and recovery of the rights and interests of the individual),
and to the frequent request of the Inter-American Commission and the
representatives of the victims (which the State itself, in the act to which I have been
referring, has implicitly transformed from the “alleged” victims of the violations that
it has acknowledged into the injured parties). Thus, the Court admits the
presentation of the evidence on the facts, during the public hearing; refers, in a
special chapter of the judgment to the proven facts, and announces in different
declarations, the existence of violations of specific human rights and freedoms. This