the ESCER, as stated both in the Convention and its Additional Protocol; 3 it purports to artificially broaden the jurisdiction of the Court, and it does not follow the Convention’s rules on its interpretation. Consequently, its content is being altered in practice beyond the limits of the rules governing its modification or amending; 4 in other words, it is making a jurisprudential mutation of the text. 5 6. The primary reason given to affirm the direct justiciability of the right to health is an argument of authority in that it cites the judgment in Lagos del Campo v. Peru, which establishes that both civil and political rights and economic, social, cultural and environmental rights must be categories understood integrally and universally “without any hierarchy, and enforceable in every case before the competent authorities.” This is a logical leap since it is one thing that the rights in both categories lack a hierarchy among them -a correct affirmation that I share- and it is another thing that they are enforceable in the same way before this Court. 7. As I have previously pointed out, to affirm the lack of the direct justiciability of the ESCER before the Court does not imply ignoring their existence, their enormous importance, their interdependent and indivisible nature with respect to political and civil rights or that they lack protection or that they should not be protected. It is the duty of the States to allow the growing autonomy of individuals, which means that they are able to count on access to primary goods (more ample than those defined within the scope of the political philosophy of John Rawls), 6 which enables their capabilities to develop; in other words, access to economic social, cultural and environmental rights. 7 8. Another reason that is advanced in favor of the Court’s jurisdiction is that Article 26 of the Convention is a framework article that includes distinct rights and that it remits to the Charter of the Organization of American States (hereinafter “the OAS Charter”). It is contended that because of certain norms, the inclusion of the right to health is derived from the Charter. In the first place, that instrument does not confer jurisdiction on the Court. Secondly, a reading of the norms from which is derived this supposed right shows that they are aspirational provisions that do not define rights or their correlative duties. 9. It is not possible to interpret Articles 34(i), 34(l) and 45(h) cited in the judgment 8 without taking into account the norm that heads the chapter on “Integral Development,” which is Article 30 of the OAS Charter. This precept states that “[t]he Member States, inspired by the principles of inter-American solidarity and cooperation, pledge themselves to a united effort to ensure 9 international social justice in their relations and integral development for their peoples, as conditions essential to peace and security. Integral development encompasses the economic, social, educational, cultural, scientific, and technological fields through which the goals that each country sets for Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Protocol of San Salvador). 4 See Articles 76(1) and 77(1) of the Convention. 5 This, of course, does not mean that the Court cannot evolutively interpret the norms of the Convention, specifying the scope of the terms employed therein according to the context in which the facts will be subsumed into the norm, as has occurred, for example, in the case of sexual orientation as a protected category, of indigenous communal property and of the concept of victim in the inter-American system of human rights. 6 RAWLS defines primary goods as a group of goods necessary to draw up and implement a rational life plan, such as freedom, opportunities, income, wealth and self-respect, “A Theory of Justice” (1995:393). 7 PÉREZ GOLDBERG, “Las mujeres privadas de libertad y el enfoque de capacidades” (2021:94-109). 8 Cf. Para. 58. 3 9 Emphasis added. 2