5 17. I return to the remarks with which I began this Opinion, so as to come to a conclusion therefrom and from the development of the precedent paragraphs. If the existence of a competent judge or court is a requirement of the proceeding and not a mere element thereof, along with those of fair trial, and if in certain hypothesis there was no such a competent judge or court, the acts performed before someone who does not bear this condition can not be considered as procedural acts in the strict sense, nor can the aggregate be qualified as true proceeding, nor its conclusion as authentic judgment. 18. Should it be the case, the Court judging violations against human rights may restrict itself to determine the capacity of the acting tribunal for the reasons described above, without being necessary for it to qualify –more precisely, to disqualify- each act performed in the alleged proceeding, taking into account the specific deficiencies those acts present: defense, legal representation, evidence, remedies, etc. Even if these proceedings had taken place with stricter attachment to the American Convention, they would not be considered as true procedural acts, nor the final decision would gain the force of authentic judgment, because both would lack the requirement –the grounds- on which the proceeding is built: a competent court, that is to say, a body vested with the indispensable jurisdictional powers to take up a certain case regarding both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction – or the profession of the person-, and the rule of equality between the parties, which only admits limited and rigorous exceptions. 19. As I have pointed out, freedom of expression constitutes another of the relevant issues of this case, according to the claim that gave rise to the proceeding before the Inter-American Court. This court did not perform a detailed and thorough revision of the characteristics of the freedom of expression with regard to the publication of the questioned book. It did not seem necessary to do so, as the information handled by the defendant came from open sources and had been of public domain. This circumstance made it unnecessary to analyze the issue any further. Had the situation been different, a situation which had led to deepest reflections, it would have been necessary to analyze how the Convention operates with regard to the State obligations and the freedoms and duties of the individual – including the duty of confidentiality and the consequences of failing to comply with it-, the rights and restrictions of Article 13 and the provisions included in Articles 29 and 32(2) of the Convention. This analysis shall be addressed some other time in the future. 20. The Court presented some considerations regarding the crime of contempt in the context of freedom of expression. I agree with the Court observations with regard to the risks that the typical formulation of contempt may entail to the freedom of expression. In my opinion added to other judgments of the Court – for instance, case of Herrera Ulloa—I expressed my points of view, which have not changed, on the exercise of criticism with regard to civil servants and the less strict requirement regarding the freedom of expression, if compared with the one which may appear when individuals are involved. What I want to enhance now is that this topic must be analyzed under the light –or the shadow- of the specific criminal formulas, that is to say, in front of “concretions” and not “abstractions.” 21. In other words, what interests and concerns is not the existence of a certain legal classification called “contempt” – a nomen juris which may loose several contents, from acceptable to inadmissible-, but the way in which that criminal concept influences the freedom of analysis and expression, and also the possibility – which was not unnoticed by the Court – that undue repression is exercised through a different criminal definition, as may be the case of the threats. It is also necessary to notice that criticism legalization does not mean to set aside the old