8 "(...) No-one now supports the old theories which purported to establish an exception in the case of legislative organs on the basis of the `sovereign' character of Parliament, or in the case of jurisdictional organs by virtue of the principle of independence of the courts or the res judicata authority of their decisions. The cases in which certain States have resorted to arguments based on principles of this kind, and have found arbitral tribunals willing to accept them, belong to the distant past. Today, the belief that the respective positions of the different powers of the State have significance only for constitutional law and none for international law (which sees the State only in its entity) is firmly rooted in international jurisprudence, the practice of States and the doctrine of international law. (...) The doctrine of the impossibility of invoking international responsibility for the acts of legislative or judicial organs has not been advanced for a long time. On the other hand, the possibility of invoking international responsibility for such acts has been directly or indirectly recognized on many occasions. (...)"20. 20. In the correct understanding of the Italian jurist, expressed as from his Second Report (of 1970), on "The Origin of International Responsibility", any conduct of a State classified by international law as internationally wrongful entails the responsibility of that State in international law; thus, any internationally wrongful act (or omission) constitutes "a source of international responsibility"; as an illustration, Ago mentioned the failure of a State to abide by the international obligation to adopt certain legislative measures required by the treaty at issue, to which it is a Party21. The damage can be taken into account, for the purpose of the determination of the reparations, "but is not a prerequisite for the determination that an internationally wrongful act has been committed"22. 21. Moreover, the independence of the characterization of a given act (or omission) as wrongful in international law from the characterization - similar or otherwise - of such act by the domestic law of the State, constitutes a general principle of the law on the international responsibility23. The fact that a given State conduct conforms itself with the provisions of domestic law, or even is required by this latter, does not mean that its internationally wrongful character can be denied, whenever it constitutes a violation of an international obligation; as pointed out by the well-known obiter dictum of the old Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the case of Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits, 1926), from the standpoint of international law, the norms of domestic law are nothing more that simple facts24. 20 . Roberto Ago (special rapporteur), "Third Report on State Responsibility: The Internationally Wrongful Act of the State, Source of International Responsibility", in United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1971)-II, part I, pp. 246-247, pars. 144 and 146. 21 . Roberto Ago (special rapporteur), "Second Report on State Responsibility: The Origin of International Responsibility", in United Nations, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1970)-II, pp. 179, 187 and 194, pars. 12, 31 and 50. 22 . 23 Roberto Ago, "Third Report on State Responsibility...", op. cit. supra n. (17), p. 223, par. 74. . Ibid., pp. 226, 232 and 238, pars. 86, 88, 103-104 and 120. . Ibid., pp. 227, 237 and 246, pars. 92, 117 and 145. - Likewise, it is jurisprudence constante of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) the principle whereby a State cannot invoke difficulties of domestic law in order to evade the observance of its international obligations, - a principle which is set forth in the two Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties (of 1969 and 1986, Article 27), and which was also singled out, in his work of codification, in 1957 and 1961, by the previous special rapporteur on the matter of the International Law Commission of the United Nations, the Cuban jurist F.V. García Amador, duly recalled by Roberto Ago (ibid., pp. 228 and 231, pars. 94 and 100). 24