9 Thus, it is not the task of international law to occupy itself with the "organization" of the State25. 22. In fact, the question of the distribution of competences, and the basic principle of the separation of powers, are of the greatest relevance in the ambit of constitutional law, but in that of international law they are nothing but facts, which have no incidence on the configuration of the international responsibility of the State. The frustrated attempts, in an already distant past, to place the legislative and judicial powers of the State out of international contacts (under the influence, to some extent, of some of the earlier manifestations of legal positivism), would have no sense in our days. They belong to a world which no longer exists. 23. The world has substantially changed already some decades ago, and no one, in sound conscience, would today pretend to advance a reasoning to that effect. The State, as an indivisible whole, remains a center of imputation, bound to answer for the internationally wrongful acts or omissions, of any of its powers, or of its agents, irrespective of hierarchy. As very well pointed out by the Swiss jurist Max Huber, in his well-known arbitral award of 1925 in the case of the Island of Palmas (The Netherlands versus United States), the competences (territorial and jurisdictional) exercised by the States have as a counterpart the duties incumbent upon them, emanated from international law, in their relations with other States26, - and, I would allow myself to add, also, under the impact of the International Law of Human Rights in the last decades, in relation to all human beings under their respective jurisdictions. 24. It is today recognized as a contribution - a clarifying element - of the prolonged labour, still unfinished, of the United Nations International Law Commission (ILC) on the Responsibility of the State (in particular of its part I), the distinction adopted between primary rules of international law, those which impose specific obligations to the States, and secondary rules of international law, those which determine the juridical consequences of the non-compliance by the States of the obligations established by the primary rules. This distinction contributes to clarify that the responsibility of the State is engaged as from the moment of the international wrongful act (or omission), there arising therefrom a subsidiary obligation to put an end to the consequences of the violation (what may mean, in the circumstances of a concrete case, e.g., to modify a national law) and to provide reparation for the damages. 25. The present Judgment of the Inter-American Court on the merits in the case of "The Last Temptation of Christ" represents, in this respect, in my view, a sensible jurisprudential advance. As known, once established the international responsibility of a State Party to a human rights treaty, such State has the duty to reestablish the situation that secures to the victims the enjoyment of their violated right (restitutio in integrum), putting an end to the situation in breach of that right, as well as, in the light of the case, to provide reparation for the consequences of such violation. The present Judgment of the Court, besides establishing the indissociability between the general duties of Articles 1.1 and 2 of the American Convention (pars. 85-90), places such duties in the framework of reparations, under Article 63.1 of the Convention: the Court 25 As recalled by R. Ago, in ibid., p. 236, par. 113. 26 U.N., Reports of International Arbitral Awards / Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. II, pp. 838- . . 839.