16 be an exceptional situation, rather than the rule. Thus, when provisional judges act for a long time, or the fact is that most judges are provisional, material hindrances to the independence of the judiciary are generated. Such vulnerable situation of the Judiciary is compounded if no removal from office procedures respectful of the international duties of the States are in place either. 44. This court has previously emphasized that the different political systems have conceived strict procedures for both the judges’ appointment and their removal. On this latter point, the Tribunal has expressed that the authority in charge of the procedure to remove a judge must behave impartially and allow the judge to exercise the right of defense.60 This is so inasmuch as the fact that judges may be removed from office at will fosters objective doubts in the beholder on the effective possibility to decide specific disputes without fearing reprisals.61 45. On the other hand, since appointments of provisional judges should be subject to such conditions of service as ensure independent exercise of their office,62 the rules on the promotion, transfer, distribution of cases, suspension, and removal from office of judges having a permanent tenure must apply fully to those judges lacking such tenure. 46. In the instant case, the Court has verified that the State afforded the victims a procedure before the CORJS before they were removed from office. It therefore remains to be determined whether such procedure conformed to the obligations of the State under the American Convention. In this regard, this Tribunal has pointed out that All the organs that exercise functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature have the obligation to adopt just decisions based on full respect for the guarantee of due process established in Article 8 of the American Convention. Article 8(1) of the Convention, which alludes to the right of every person to a hearing by a “competent judge or tribunal” for the “determination of his rights,” is also applicable in situations in which a public rather than a judicial authority issues decisions that affect the determination of such rights, as occurred in the instant case. 63 2. Jurisdiction 47. The representative argued that the Plenary Chamber of the STJ—rather than CORJS— was “the only” body that “could remove from their offices those it had previously appointed as judges of the First Court,” by operation of the principle of parallelism of forms. In support of this argument, he referred to a report issued by a Commission appointed by the Plenary Chamber of the STJ. On the other I.3 of the Recommendation No. R (94) 12 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Independence, Efficiency and Role of Judges adopted by the Committee of Ministers on October 13, 1994 at the 518th meeting of the Ministers' Deputies. See also affidavit on January 15, 2008 by Param Cumaraswamy (File on the Merits, Book III, pp. 822 to 836). 60 Cf. Case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of January 31, 2001. Series C No. 71, paras. 73 and 74. 61 Principles 2, 3 and 4 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 59. 62 Principle 11 of the United Nations Basic Principles, supra note 59, and Guideline II in the Latimer House Guidelines for the Commonwealth on Parliamentary Supremacy and Judicial Independence adopted at a meeting of representatives of the Commonwealth Legal Education Association, the Commonwealth Magistrates' and Judges' Association and the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association held on June 19, 1998. 63 Cf. Case of Yatama v. Nicaragua. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of June 23, 2005. Series C No. 127, para. 149.