51 Inter-American Commission in relation to the alleged violation of Article 24,204 the Court is able to examine the possible violation of this right, because the decisions on inadmissibility that the Commission takes, based on Article 47(b) and (c), are prima facie juridical assessments that do not limit the Court’s competence to rule on a point of law that the Commission has only analyzed in a preliminary manner. The Court will therefore divide the examination of the arguments of the parties as follows: (1) discrimination in the application of the sanction of removal from office; (2) discrimination regarding access to the Judiciary, and (3) discrimination regarding the application of procedural law. 1. from office Discrimination in the application of the sanction of removal 190. The State’s principal defense in relation to the existence of possible discrimination is that “there can be no discriminatory treatment among those who are not equal, only among those who are equal,” and that, in this case, the three victims were not in a situation of equality in relation to the other two judges of the First Court, as regards both retirement, and access to other positions in the Judiciary. 191. The five judges who were members of the First Court were subjected to an administrative procedure because they had unanimously handed down a judgment on the basis of which the existence of an inexcusable judicial error was declared. 192. Judges Apitz, Rocha and Ruggeri were removed from office by the disciplinary instance in application of Article 40, part 4 of the Judiciary Career Act,205 which establishes that “judges shall be removed from office [...] [w]hen they have incurred in grave inexcusable judicial error.”206 In other words, this provision establishes that, based on a specific assumption –the commission of an inexcusable judicial error– there is an explicit juridical consequence –dismissal. 193. This punitive consequence was not applied to Judges Marrero and Morales.207 In the case of Judge Evelyn Marrero, the CORJS did not order her dismissal even though it had verified she had also committed the same inexcusable judicial error. In doing so, the CORJS took into consideration that there was a preceding decision that declared that this judge had complied with the requirements for retirement, so that: “... given the binding legal opinion of the Chamber for Constitutional Matters of the [STJ], of February 8, 2002, and in order to safeguard a social right, such as the right to retirement, which cannot be infringed, this disciplinary instance declares that the existence of the said decision of the [STJ] renders the enforcement of the sanction impossible as regards citizen EVELYN MARGARITA MARRERO ORTIZ and, consequently, it declares that there is no issue at stake to be decided.”208 204 Cf. Report on Admissibility N° 24/05 issued by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on March 8, 2005, para. 46 (File of Attachments to the Application, Book I, Appendix B, p. 66). 205 Cf. decision of October 30, 2003 issued by the CORJS, supra note 49, pp. 1087 to 1089. 206 Cf. article 40, part 4 of the Venezuelan Ley de Carrera Judicial [Judiciary Career Act], supra note 82. 207 However, a certified copy of the decision of the CORJS was attached to the file of the five judges. Cf. decision of the CORJS of October 30, 2003, supra note 49, p. 1089. 208 Cf. decision of October 30, 2003 issued by the CORJS, supra note 49, pp. 1087 and 1088 (highlight omitted).