54 202. The Court observes that, as a result of their removal from office, the three victims could not return to occupy other positions in the Judiciary. Moreover, Venezuelan laws establish the following provisions in this regard: i) Section 7 of the STJ Organic Law, which stipulates: to be a Justice of the [STJ], candidates must satisfy the following requirements: […] 4. They must not have been subject to administrative or disciplinary proceedings or to a lawsuit and they must not have been sentenced thereunder by a final and conclusive judgment or decision.216 ii) Section 11 of the Judiciary Career Act, which establishes: The following persons shall not be appointed Judges: […] anyone having a criminal record or upon whom sentence was imposed by a Court or professional disciplinary authority that adversely affects their reputation; anyone engaging in conduct that affects the dignity of the office or impairs its image in the eyes of the public.217 203. The State argued that there is no “reliable evidence” of a legal prohibition that would prevent the reincorporation of the victims into the Judiciary. However, it did not submit case law or any other type of evidence to invalidate the evident implications of the STJ Organic Law and the Judiciary Career Act on this point. To the contrary, in its final written arguments, the State itself affirmed that, based on the Judiciary Career Act in force at the time of the facts, and “given the nature of the sanction of removal from office, applicable to all those judges who have committed grave errors in the performance of their duties, it has been established that one of the consequences is to preclude the official who has been dismissed from reincorporating into the Judiciary, when their unsuitability for the office they occupied has been proved.” Consequently, the Court finds it has been proved that it was impossible for the victims to attain other positions in the Judiciary as a result of their removal from office. 204. Since Judges Morales and Marrero had retired, rather than being removed from office, they did not have this impediment. Indeed, the Court observes that Article 41 of the Judiciary Career Act establishes that “[j]udges who have retired can be re-appointed”218 as such. The State also acknowledged that “the only exceptional case of reincorporation into the Judiciary or any other position in the public administration of the State [is] when a judge allegedly implicated in grounds for removal from office has been granted […] the benefit of retirement, which […] makes it impossible to impose any disciplinary sanction, given that the right to retirement operates ex officio.” In other words, Judges Marrero and Morales could resume their functions in the judiciary and in fact did, because on December 13, 2004, Luisa Estela Morales and Evelyn Marrero, who had issued the same sentence that was qualified as inexcusable judicial error and which resulted in the dismissal of Judges Apitz, Rocha, and Ruggeri, were appointed justices of the STJ.219 205. Based on the above, it has been proven that the victims had a legal impediment to accede to the Judiciary and that, because of this, they did not submit 216 Cf. STJ Organic Law, supra note 31. 217 Cf. Judiciary Career Act, supra note 82. 218 Cf. Judiciary Career Act, supra note 82. 219 Cf. special session of the National Assembly of December 13, 2004, supra note 113.