41 appointing new members.168 At the public hearing held before the Court, Mr. Damián Nieto Carrillo, the CORJS’s President, stated that “continuance [in] office is [n]ot established with absolute certainty,” that the members of the Commission are “virtually temporary members because [they are] awaiting the [enactment of the] Code [of Ethics]” and “they [can] be removed at any time.”169 142. The available evidence leads to the conclusion that the STJ has full discretion to reorganize the CORJS, and there is no pre-established procedure or mechanism conforming to the due guarantees for the appointment or removal of members of the CORJS. 143. On the other hand, the Commission stated that “in observance of the principle of the margin of appreciation of States,” a temporary disciplinary regime can be admissible provided that a “strict judgment shows that this judicial policy is warranted.” In the Commission’s view, the temporary disciplinary regime instituted in Venezuela “has tended to become permanent, although no objective or reasonable factors have been shown to justify [it],” even more so where the irremovability of judges “is not respected if the institutional framework that regulates [it] is provisional and temporary.” Accordingly, “the jurisdictional checks and balances that were necessary in order for judges who were overseeing disciplinary proceedings against judicial officials to be fully independent were impeded.” In the Commission’s view, this affected the case under consideration, as “the existing regulatory mechanisms did not offer the guarantees that a disciplinary jurisdiction must offer” and gave various authorities the opportunity “to wield excessive power, which in the case under consideration was demonstrated by the misuse of power at the time the victims were removed.” 144. The representative further stated that this transitional regime “tends to become permanent” and “is grounded in a constitutional omission and in the rules of an emergency regime that is extraordinary in nature, whose rules are contrary to the guarantees of judicial independence and due process.” 145. The State maintained that the different public authorities have “made persistent efforts to do away with […] the transitional regime within the [J]udicial [B]ranch.” In this regard, it made reference to the bill for the enactment of the Code of Ethics submitted to the National Assembly, the “Rules on the Leadership, Governance, and Administration of the Judicial Branch,” and a court declaration of “legislative inaction” whereby the Legislative Branch was urged “to pass such legislation.” The State further indicated that the transitional regime features the “coexistence and coherent application of pre-constitutional, supra-constitutional and post-constitutional rules,” without which “it would have been […] unfeasible to guarantee the enjoyment of all rights of the Venezuelan people.” It also stated that “[t]he appointment of the former temporary judges of the First Court was made under the same transitional regime.” 146. The Court has verified that the transitional regime has been in place since 1999, even though the Constitution provided that its effective term was not to extend beyond one year from the creation of the National Assembly.170 The State made reference to a judgment rendered in 2006 by the Chamber for Constitutional 168 Cf. judgment No. 1764 of August 15, 2007, rendered by the Chamber for Constitutional Matters of the STJ, supra note 13. 169 Cf. informative statement of Damián Adolfo Nieto Carrillo, delivered at the public hearing held before the Inter-American Court on January 31, 2008. 170 Cf. fifth part of the fourth temporary provision of the Constitution.