53 deprive judges from social security retirement benefits, the instant file contains evidence that the Chamber for Constitutional Matters of the STJ had previously declared as unconstitutional the section of Article 41 of the Judiciary Career Act that prohibited the enjoyment of retirement to judges who had been dismissed.212 This leads the Court to conclude that there was no need to set aside the disciplinary sanction of removal from office in order to concede the right to retirement corresponding to years of service. Both situations could occur simultaneously. 199. Moreover, the CPAM indicated that “this condition does not exempt this Chamber from ordering the [IGC] to take the necessary steps, using the respective administrative procedure, in order to establish the appropriate disciplinary responsibilities […] which are not in any way excluded because there is an acquired right in their favor, such as retirement.”213 In another case, the same Chamber indicated that “whether or not the sanctioned judge had obtained the benefit of retirement, this does not prevent the pertinent decisions from being taken, should it be found true that the judge had conducted herself inappropriately in the exercise of her judicial office, and this should be recorded in her personal file.”214 200. The Court concludes that the five judges should be considered as identically situated as regards the commission of the disciplinary infringement. However, the Court lacks jurisdiction to determine whether a disciplinary sanction should be imposed in the instant case and, in such event, to whom would it apply. Indeed, the Court is not able to determine whether Judges Marrero and Morales should have been sanctioned in the exact same fashion as the alleged victims in the instant case. Thus, Article 24 of the Convention does not grant the alleged victims the right to demand the imposition of the disciplinary sanction of removal from office against Judges Marrero and Morales.215 Hence, it is not possible to declare the violation of Article 24 in the present case. 2. Judiciary Discrimination as regards access to other positions in the 201. The representative argued that discrimination existed not only when removing the victims from office, but that they were discriminated against as regards access to other positions in the Judiciary, because Judges Marrero and Morales were able to reincorporate into the judicature, being appointed to the STJ, while the victims are impeded from acceding to judicial positions “derived directly from the law.” 212 Cf. judgment No. 238 of February 20, 2003 issued by Chamber for Constitutional Matters of the STJ (File on the Merits, Book IV, p. 1120). 213 1048). 214 Cf. judgment No. 4579 of June 29 2005 issued by the CPAM (File on the Merits, Book IV, p. Cf. judgment No. 617 of April 24, 2007 issued by the CPAM (File on the Merits, Book IV, p. 1058). 215 Similarly, the Human Rights Committee stated that “the exemption of only one group of conscientious objectors and the inapplicability of the exemption for all others cannot be considered reasonable [given that] when a right of conscientious objection to military service is recognized […], no differentiation shall be made among conscientious objectors on the basis of the nature of their particular beliefs. However, in the instant case, the Committee considers that the author has not shown that his convictions as a pacifist are incompatible with the system of substitute service in the Netherlands or that the privileged treatment accorded to Jehova’s Witnesses adversely affected his rights as a conscientious objector against military service.” United Nations, Human Rights Committee, Case of Brinkoff v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 402/1990, CCPR/C/48/D/402/1990, July 27, 1993, para. 9.3.