- 79 1. The prison sentence to be imposed on him will be less than four years, or when the accused has been detained for more than two-thirds of the prison term requested by the prosecutor in the written indictment. 2. The probability that the accused will evade prosecution or disrupt the probative activity has ceased. 3. The accused provides the surety that has been established or, if applicable, the person who is insolvent offers a personal guarantee.328 243. Based on the foregoing, the Court will analyze the alleged violations as regards: (A) the arbitrary nature of the provisional arrest; (B) the alleged unlawful and arbitrary nature of the detention following the decision of the Constitutional Court; (C) the duration of the provisional arrest, and (D) the right to appeal before a competent judge or court. Lastly, it will refer to (E) the alleged violation of the right to personal integrity. A. Arbitrary nature of the provisional arrest A.1) Arguments of the parties and of the Commission 244. The Commission argued that, when determining the need for provisional arrest with a view to extradition, the concept of “procedural risk” should also be taken into consideration. Thus, it concluded that “the decision in the appeal of December 11, 2008, was arbitrary” since it indicated that “the concept of ‘procedural risk’ did not have to be examined, because this was not a criminal case instituted in Peru, but a ‘provisional arrest made with a view to extradition.’” The Commission also argued that “the absence of a time limit expressly established for a provisional arrest with a view to extradition […] is incompatible with the principle of predictability.” 245. The representative argued that the decision in the appeal concerning the detention of Wong Ho Wing did not take into account “whether […] he would evade prosecution and interfere with the extradition process.” He also underlined that the Chamber had not “verified the existence of other less onerous measures.” Therefore, he argued that since the provisional arrest was “unreasonable, disproportionate and lacking appropriate grounds […] Peru had violated the rights to personal liberty (Article 7(3)) and judicial guarantees (Article 8(1)) recognized in the Convention.” He added that “the procedural laws with regard to extradition do not establish a time limit for deprivation of liberty during the extradition process or when they should conclude, [which] adds a degree of arbitrariness to the situation of Wong Ho Wing.” Accordingly, he alleged the violation of Article 7(5) in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention. 246. The State indicated that “[t]he deprivation of liberty [of Wong Ho Wing] was the result of a duly founded provisional arrest warrant issued by the competent jurisdictional organ,” so that it was in keeping with the laws of Peru. It also indicated that “the procedural risk was evaluated and his specific situation analyzed, and it was considered that his personal liberty should be limited to ensure that he could not interfere with the ongoing investigations or avoid prosecution.” It emphasized that, during the appeal proceedings, “the presumed victim’s defense counsel did not provide evidence in relation to the procedural risk.” The State added that the representative had not filed any remedy against the second instance decision confirming the provisional arrest that could have been “contested by an application for habeas corpus.” Regarding the failure to regulate the time limit for detention, it argued that “the inter-American system does not have a standard or guidelines in its case law related to the ‘principle of predictability’ that can be used as a reference to determine international responsibility for violation of Article 7(5).” On this point, it affirmed that 328 Procedural Code promulgated by Legislative Decree No. 638 of April 27, 1991 (evidence file, folio 8623).