been able to comply with the payment of the compensation either, since “the main obligation was impossible because it ran counter to the basic structure of Ecuador’s legal system.” 25. The Commission indicated, first, that “this case was conducted before the Commission strictly respecting the principle of due process of law” and that, “throughout the proceedings, the State had numerous opportunities to present and dispute factual and legal arguments in exercise of its right of defense.” Regarding the alleged violations of the State’s right of defense in the proceedings before it, the Commission affirmed that “the State has not explained the reasons why a joint hearing on two cases with common elements prejudiced its ability to defend itself” because, in the Commission’s opinion, “[t]he State was notified of the hearing, appeared before it, and played an active role.” The Commission added that “the State has failed to prove a violation of the right of defense that could give rise to the Court’s exceptional authority to review a procedural act of the Commission.” The Commission concluded that the “position [of the State] was duly analyzed by the Commission and incorporated into its Merits Report”; hence, it “ask[ed] the Court to reject the preliminary objection of ‘violation of the State’s right of defense” filed by the State. Regarding the second preliminary objection filed by the State, the Commission indicated, first, that “the State never contested the judicial nature” of the members of the Constitutional Tribunal. In this regard, the Commission cited “the principle of estoppel,” one of the “fundamental elements of which is precisely the need to safeguard the procedural positions that a party to the proceedings may assume based on the positions of the other party.” The Commission also stated that, “regardless of the title ‘judges,’ ‘justices,’ ‘magistrates,’ or ‘members,’ there is no doubt that the members of the Constitutional Tribunal of Ecuador […] performed functions of a judicial nature.” 26. The representatives also contested the preliminary objections filed by the State. Regarding the first preliminary objection presented by the State, the representatives argued that “the State was duly notified by the [Commission] to present its evidence and arguments in both hearings, because the notification for both was presented to the parties at the same time.” They argued that “in this case, two hearings were held; one on admissibility on March 13, 2006, and the other on merits on March 10, 2008.” And that, “at both hearings, the [Commission] decided to hear the arguments of the parties in cases 12,597 and 12,600.” In addition, the representatives indicated that “the State did not ask that the hearing not be held, but presented its arguments”; hence, they considered that, in keeping with “the principle of estoppel […] the State cannot change its position in the proceedings to benefit itself.” Regarding the second objection filed by the State, the representatives accepted that “the [Constitutional Tribunal,] according to Ecuadorian constitutional norms, was not part of the Judiciary,” but stated that “the recommendation [made by the Commission] [was] clear and” that “the formal error in no way altere[d] the State’s obligation to comply with the Commission’s recommendations, because “the substance of the case is that the [Commission] considered that the rights of the former members of the [Constitutional Tribunal] had been violated, and that, consequently, it was necessary to make reparations.” Considerations of the Court 27. Based on the provisions of Article 42(6), in conjunction with the provisions of Articles 61, 62 and 64, all of its Rules of Procedure, the Court finds that, by making an acknowledgment of responsibility, the State has accepted the full competence of the Court to hear the case, so that, in the circumstances of this case, the filing of preliminary objections associated with the presumed violation of the right of defense or the impossibility 10