ha[d] an individual dimension related to the judge himself as the possessor of rights” and, “on the other hand, stability guarantee[d] judicial independence.” They argued that “[i]n the hypothesis of a State in which judges [were] removed arbitrarily from their posts owing to the content of their rulings, especially if there was certainty that they [could] only retain their posts if they favor[ed] one political party, the guarantee of access in equal conditions [would be] non-existent,” which “would mean that ethical professionals who refused to accept political pressure on compliance with their functions as a judge, would exclude themselves […] from the selection process.” 128. The State did not refer explicitly to the alleged lack of competence of the National Congress to declare the termination of the judges. 129. The State argued that Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention was not violated, because: (i) “Article 23[(1)(c)] refers to political rights in relation to access to public service and participation in public life, [and] the political rights [of the judges] as citizens, were not restricted in any way”; (ii) the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal were not restricted under any constitutional or infra-constitutional norm from having access and acquiring elected office”; (iii) “they were not prevented by any administrative decision from having access to positions of trust,” and (iv) “over the last five years, the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal have had full access to the numerous competitions to select judges and justices, and could have been examined by the different selection mechanisms.” The State also argued that several of the judges became professors at public universities, and that the guarantee of stability of the post of judge was fully regulated in the 1998 Constitution, and in the domestic laws, such as the Organic Law on Constitutional Control in force at the time of the facts. 2. Arguments on the nature of the termination decision 130. The Commission argued that the “supposed illegality in the appointment was merely a justification to impose a de facto sanction, infringing the principle of legality.” It indicated that it “does not ignore the fact that there may be removals from office in which doubts can arise about whether this has occurred as a result of the passage of time or a forced retirement, or whether, as an expression of the State’s punitive powers,” and that “there may be decisions that are formally valid, but that are not used as legitimate recourses for administration of justice, but rather as mechanisms to achieve undeclared objectives that are not evident at first sight, and that are aimed at establishing an ‘implicit’ sanction with a different objective from that for which they have been established by law.” Therefore, “in case of doubt about whether it was a removal owing to completion of the term or conditions, or whether it was a punitive removal, it is important to consider the existence of a series of indications about the possible causal relationship between the circumstantial evidence, the act that appears to be legal, and the removal of the judge from office. In this type of case, the circumstantial evidence is necessary in order to find that the elements leading to the presumption of the existence of an implicit sanction are objective and to allow it to be affirmed that an act of the public authorities is not congruent with the objectives apparently sought.” 131. The representatives argued that “[t]he resolution adopted by the National Congress sought to give the appearance that it was not a punitive action, but rather the rectification of an error of the National Congress; nevertheless, the statements made by the members of Congress during the debate on the day of the resolution, as well as the statement of the State’s Agent during the hearing before the [Commission] reveal that the intention behind the resolution was to remove the judges […] from office for supposed acts of corruption and membership in certain political parties.” 41