is exclusively for the causes permitted, either by means of a procedure that complies with judicial guarantees or because the term or period of his mandate has ended, and (iii) when the permanence of judges in office is arbitrarily affected, the right to judicial independence established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention is violated, in conjunction with the right of access to and permanence in public service, under general conditions of equality, established in Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention. 3.2. The sanction of the judges based on the judgments they delivered 200. As the Court has indicated previously, judges may only be removed for serious disciplinary offenses or incompetence, and by proceedings with due guarantees or when their term of office has ended (supra para. 191). Dismissal cannot be an arbitrary measure, and must be analyzed in light of the existing domestic legal framework and the circumstances of the specific case. 201. In the instant case, article 130(9) of the 1998 Constitution (supra para. 67) indicated that judges: May be impeached for legal or constitutional offenses in the exercise of their functions. Congress may censure them if they are found guilty by a majority of its members. The censure shall result in the immediate dismissal of the official. 202. In addition, article 199 of the 1998 Constitution of Ecuador (supra para. 49) indicated that: The organs of the Judiciary shall be independent in the exercise of their obligations and attributes. No function of the State may interfere in matters that are exclusive to them. Justices and judges shall be independent in the exercise of their jurisdictional powers, even in relation to the other organs of the judicial function; they shall only be subject to the Constitution and the law. 203. Also, article 9 of the 1997 Law on Constitutional Control, established that the members of the Constitutional Tribunal “shall not be held responsible for the votes they emit and for the opinions they express in the exercise of the attributes inherent in their functions.”244 In this regard, expert witness Alejandro Ponce Villacís indicated that “the separation […] of a judge from his functions, as a sanction, should be reserved for the most egregious acts.”245 204. Taking these elements into account, pursuant to the applicable domestic law at the time of the events, the purpose of an impeachment proceeding by the National Congress could not be the dismissal of a member of the Constitutional Tribunal based on a review of the constitutionality or legality of the judgments adopted by that body. This is due to the separation of powers and the exclusive competence of the Constitutional Tribunal to review the formal and/or substantial constitutionality of the laws enacted by the National Congress. 205. In the instant case, the six motions of censure that were submitted against the judges were directly related to judgments that the Constitutional Tribunal had delivered; in particular the decisions concerning the fourteenth salary and the D´Hondt method (supra para. 80). In fact, one of the motions of censure (E) tabled on May 31, 2004, requested expressly that impeachment proceedings be held owing to the decision of the judges in 244 Article 9 of the 1997 Law on Constitutional Control (merits file, tome IV, folio 1761). 245 Affidavit prepared by expert witness Alejandro Ponce Villacís on March 13, 2013 (merits file, tome III, folio 1357). 60