Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 265. The Commission asked the Court to order the State to ”adopt measures of nonrepetition, that ensure the increased independence of the Judiciary, including the measures necessary so that domestic law and applicable practice abide by clear criteria and ensure guarantees in the appointment, tenure, and removal of judges, in particular, a long enough term in judicial office to guarantee their independence, and determination of the grounds for impeachment, in accordance with the standards established in the American Convention.” 266. The representatives argued that although “Ecuador has carried out an extensive legal reform by enacting the 2008 Constitution, which took away from the Legislature the power to impeach the judges of the Constitutional Court, […t]he legislation required to guarantee the principle of legality and judicial guarantees has not yet been enacted. In addition, the system for constituting the Constitutional Court permits the political composition of the organ, without an open competition on the basis of merits, and this seriously compromises the independence of this important entity.” They added that “[t]he fact that only candidates proposed by the President of the Republic, the National Assembly, and the Council for Transparency and Social Control participate would result in the composition of the Court being easily manipulated; also, each organ may only proposed three candidates, so that they are elected without competing for the position. This jeopardizes the principle of the independence and impartiality of justice.” 267. The representatives asked, inter alia: (i) “to extend the norms established for the Judiciary in the current Constitution, to the functioning of the actual Constitutional Court”; (ii) “to establish as a cause for impeachment, undue and unconstitutional interference in the independence of the Constitutional Court”; (iii) “to define by law […] as an offense any attempt against judicial independence, from either internal or external sources,” and (iv) that the State “undertake a legislative reform at all levels that permits amending the manner of selecting the judges of the Constitutional Court, in accordance with the principle of judicial independence, particularly the free proposal of candidates, a public competition on merits, and the possibility of challenges by the citizens.” 268. The State argued 2008 Constitution of the Control is responsible for is “developing effective Constitutional Court.” that Ecuador “is undergoing a time of change initiated as of the Republic,” and that “a Council on Citizen Participation and Social the selection of the new judges of the Constitutional Court,” which procedures for the appointment of the new judges of the 269. Regarding the request to extend the norms for the Judiciary of the current Constitution to the actual Constitutional Court, it indicated that “there is a difference between the Judiciary and constitutional supremacy; the Constitutional Court is part of the latter; in other words, there is clear independence of functions.” In its final written arguments, the State indicated that the actual Constitutional Court possesses total administrative and financial independence, and that the provision that its members are subject to impeachment has been eliminated. 270. In relation to the request for a reform of the law with regard to the selection of the judges of the Constitutional Court, the State stressed the “subsidiary nature” of the interAmerican human rights system, and that “this is the responsibility of the domestic organs; namely, the Legislature,” clarifying that the “Council for Citizen Participation and Social Control [was] developing effective procedures for the appointment of the new judges of the Constitutional Court”. 78