Considerations of the Court 301. In its case law, the Court has developed the concept of non-pecuniary damage and has established that this “may include both the suffering and difficulties caused to the direct victim and his next of kin, the impairment of values that are of great significance to the individual, as well as the changes, of a non-pecuniary nature, in the living conditions of the victim or his family.”318 Given that it is not possible to allocate a precise monetary equivalent to non-pecuniary damage, it can only be compensated, in order to achieve the integral reparation of the victim, by the payment of a sum of money or by the delivery of goods and services that have a monetary value, determined by the Court by the reasonable application of sound judicial discretion and based on equity.319 302. In addition, the Court reiterates the compensatory nature of indemnities, the type and amount depend on the harm caused, so that they should not entail either the enrichment or the impoverishment of the victims or their heirs. 320 303. The Court has maintained that non-pecuniary damage is evident, because it is inherent in human nature that any person who endures a violation of his human rights experiences suffering.321 However, this suffering does not necessarily have to be redressed with money. Depending on the specific case, adequate reparation could be the Court’s delivery of a judgment sentencing the State.322 304. In this case, in their affidavits, several of the judges who were terminated and subjected to impeachment proceedings referred to the effects that the events had had on them. Thus, Mr. Herrería Bonnet stated that “[t]he termination […] had severe effects on his personal and family life,” because “[t]he extensive media coverage of the activities of the Ecuadorian Congress and the unfounded accusation that it had made, […] ended up affecting [his] right to honor and a good reputation,” and that “it caused distress in [his] home, because its peace, privacy and family harmony were jeopardized.” In addition, he stated that “there are members of the public who do not understand that the termination of which [he] was the victim was unjustified, and the doubt remains that [he] may have committed an offense.” Mr. Jaramillo Córdova felt that “it affected [his] daily work in [his] professional field and, for the same reason, [he] was marginalized from some possible functions that he would have liked to occupy.” Mr. Terán Cevallos declared that the events made him feel “an unspeakable anguish and a feeling of helplessness […], to such a degree that [he] experienced a state of depression and stress that affected [him] for a long time,” and that “[t]he emotional crisis […] affected [his] family.” He indicated that he “was unable 318 Cf. Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs, para. 84, and Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, para. 350. 319 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru. Reparations and costs. Judgment of December 3, 2001. Series C No. 88, para. 53, and Case of Vélez Loor v. Panama. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of November 23, 2010 Series C No. 218, para. 310. 320 Cf. Case of the “White Van” (Paniagua Morales et al.) v. Guatemala. Reparations and costs. Judgment of May 25, 2001. Series C No. 76, para. 79, and Case of Artavia Murillo et al. ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica, para. 362. 321 Cf. Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, para. 176, and Case of the Massacres of El Mozote and nearby places v. El Salvador. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 25, 2012. Series C No. 252, para. 383. 322 Cf. Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of June 20, 2005. Series C No. 126, para. 130, and Case of Reverón Trujillo v. Venezuela, para. 176. 87

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