existence of specific evidence. However, in its considerations it limited itself to the application of a test of speculative damage, merely referring, as regards the alleged damage, to “the possible confusion of sexual roles” and the “situation of risk for the girls’ development”.153 The Supreme Court of Justice referred to “the deterioration of the social, family, and educational environment of the girls since the mother began to cohabit with her homosexual partner,” without specifying the connection between said cohabitation and the alleged deterioration. It did not present arguments to challenge the possibility that the alleged deterioration might not have occurred as a result of the relationship with the new partner, but rather as a consequence of the parents’ earlier separation and its possible negative effects on the girls. Nor did the Supreme Court of Justice present specific arguments to support the claim that the family situation with the father was more favorable. The Supreme Court of Justice’s argument was based on the potential psychological damage that might be caused to the three girls by their living with a homosexual couple, without giving sufficiently weighty reasons that would serve to refute the claim that the parents’ sexual orientation does not have a negative effect on the child’s psychological and emotional wellbeing, development, sexual orientation and social relationships. 131. The Inter-American Court concludes that the Supreme Court of Justice did not comply with the requirement to apply a strict scrutiny test and substantiate the specific harm allegedly suffered by the three girls as a result of their mother cohabiting with a same-sex partner. Moreover, the Court considers that, in this specific case, the fact of the girls living with their mother and her partner did not deprive them of a father, since the purpose of the custody hearing did not imply that the father would have lost contact with them. 4.3. Alleged privilege of interests 132. In its judgment, the Supreme Court indicated that “it cannot be ignored that the mother of the minors, in making the decision to openly express her homosexuality, as may be done freely by anyone in the context of very personal gender rights, without deserving any juridical disapproval or reproach for this, put her own interests before those of her daughters, especially when she began to live with her homosexual partner in the same home where she undertook the upbringing and care of her daughters separately from their father.” 154 Similarly, the Juvenile Court of Villarrica declared that “the respondent has given preference to her own well-being and personal interest over carrying out her role as a mother, under conditions that could affect the subsequent development of the minors” 155. 133. The Inter-American Court considers it necessary to emphasize that the scope of the right to non-discrimination due to sexual orientation is not limited to the fact of being a homosexual per se, but includes its expression and the ensuing consequences in a person’s life project. In this regard, in the Case of Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights stated that both sexual orientation and its exercise are a relevant aspect of private life156. 153 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile of May 31, 2004 (record of appendices to the petition, volume V, page 2672). 154 Judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice of Chile, May 31 2004 (record of appendices to the petition, volume V, page 2672). 155 Decision on provisional custody issued by the Juvenile Court of Villarrica, May 2 2003 (record of appendices to the petition, volume V, page 2567). 156 Cf. ECHR, Case of Laskey, Jaggard, and Brown v. United Kingdom, (No. 21627/93; 21826/93; 21974/93), Judgment of February 19, 1997, para. 36 (“There can be no doubt that sexual orientation and activity concern an 45