136. In this regard, a person’s sexual orientation is also linked to the notion of freedom and a person’s right to self-determination and to freely choose the options and circumstances that give meaning to his or her existence, in accordance with his or her own choices and convictions 160. Therefore, “ [t]he emotional life with the spouse or permanent partner, which obviously includes sexual relationships, is one of the main aspects of that realm or circle of intimacy”161. 137. For its part, the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico has stated that: from human dignity […] arises, among others, the free development of the personality, that is, every individual’s right to choose, freely and in an autonomous manner, how to live their life, which includes, among other expressions, […] their free sexual choice. […] [a] person’s sexual orientation, as part of their personal identity, [is] a relevant element in any life project they may have and that, as any other person, includes the desire to share their life with another person of the same or different sex162. 138. In the instant case, the Court notes that both the Supreme Court of Justice and the Juvenile Court of Villarica based their decisions to award custody to the father on the assumption that Ms. Atala could openly declare herself a lesbian. However, they indicated that by exercising her homosexuality when she decided to live with a same-sex partner, she put her own interests before those of her daughters (supra paras. 41 and 56). 139. In this regard, the Court considers that the prohibition of discrimination due to sexual orientation should include, as protected rights, the conduct associated with the expression of homosexuality. Furthermore, if sexual orientation is an essential component of a person’s identity163, it was not reasonable to require Ms. Atala to put he life and family project on hold in order to allegedly protect her daughters. Under no circumstance can it be considered “legally reprehensible” that Ms. Atala made the decision to restart her life. Furthermore, no evidence was found of any harm caused to the three girls. 140. Therefore, the Court considers that to require the mother to limit her lifestyle options implies using a “traditional” concept of women’s social role as mothers, according to which it is socially expected that women bear the main responsibility for their children’s upbringing and that in pursuit of this she should have given precedence to raising her children, renouncing an essential aspect of her identity. Therefore, the Court considers that using the argument of Ms. Atala’s alleged preference of her personal interests, does not fulfill the purpose of protecting the best interest of the three girls. course of their working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity of developing relationships with the outside world”). 160 Mutatis mutandi, Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez. v. Ecuador. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 21, 2007. Series C No. 170, para. 52. 161 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Judgment T-499, 2003. The Constitutional Court has defined the right to the free development of the personality, enshrined in Article 16 of the Political Constitution of Colombia, as the right of persons to “choose their life plan and develop their personality according to their interests, wishes and convictions, provided that it does not affect the rights of others, or violate the constitutional order” (Constitutional Court, Judgment C-309 of 1997), and “a person’s capacity to independently make the life choices that will determine the course of his existence” (Constitutional Court, Judgment SU-642 of 1998). 162 Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico, Action of Unconstitutionality A.I. 2/2010, August 16, 2010, paras. 263 and 264. 163 Cf. ECHR, Case of Clift, supra note ¡Error! Marcador no definido., para. 57 (“the Court has considered to constitute ‘other status’ characteristics which, like some of the specific examples listed in the Article, can be said to be personal in the sense that they are innate or inherent. Thus in Salgueiro da Silva Mouta, […] it found that sexual orientation was [‘]undoubtedly covered[’] by Article 14”). 47