suspending the effects of the measure.” 215 On June 11, 2012, the judge determined that complainant Piriz had not responded to the notification and, therefore, considered “that the claim was no longer valid as he had failed to take advantage of it” and ordered that the proceeding be referred to the higher court. 216 On August 1, 2012, the presumed victims reiterated their request for a decision on this appeal. 217 The Appellate Chamber considered that “despite the ample and flexible criteria that should prevail when analyzing the requirements to be met in the technical content of the brief with grievances, since the petition [of the presumed victims] does not provide any evidence to be able to examine this (art. 260 CPCC), [the Chamber] finds that it must declare the relinquishment of the appeal.” 218 The presumed victims filed an appeal for the reversal of this decision, which was declared inadmissible. 219 The Court has not received any more recent information on whether the precautionary measures remain in force. VIII FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY AND RETROACTIVITY, IN RELATION TO THE OBLIGATION TO RESPECT AND TO ENSURE RIGHTS AND THE OBLIGATION TO ADOPT PROVISIONS OF DOMESTIC LAW 113. In this chapter, the Court will summarize the arguments of the Inter-American Commission and of the parties, and will then rule on the alleged violation of freedom of expression, and the alleged violation of the principle of legality and retroactivity to the detriment of Carlos and Pablo Mémoli. A. The alleged violation of freedom of expression A.1) Arguments of the Commission and of the parties 114. The Commission indicated that “any measure that restricts freedom of expression must comply with three requirements established in Article 13(2) [of the American Convention].” It pointed out that the parties agree that the criminal conviction of the presumed victims signified a restriction of freedom of expression. The Commission indicated that the Court “has already concluded [in the Kimel case] that the definition of the offense of defamation that existed when Carlos and Pablo Mémoli were sentenced in the criminal jurisdiction was incompatible with the Convention,” so that “[i]n strict application of this case law,” it concluded that the criminal sanction imposed violated freedom of expression. The Commission indicated that, since the requirement of legality was not met, “it was unnecessary to continue [analyzing] the three requirements,” in relation to the alleged restriction imposed. The Commission argued that the statements made by Messrs. Mémoli 215 Brief of December 30, 2011 (file of annexes to the pleadings and motions brief, annex 2, folios 1706 and 1707), and decision of December 30, 2011 (file of annexes to the pleadings and motions brief, annex 2, folio 1708). 216 Cf. Decision of June 11, 2012 (merits file, annex G, folio 444). 217 Cf. Brief of August 1, 2012 (merits file, annex G, folio 468). 218 Decision of August 7, 2012 (merits file, annex G, folio 481). In this regard, Article 260 of the Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure establishes that: “[t]he brief with the grievance shall contain the specific and reasoned critique of the parts of the ruling that the appellant considers erroneous. It is not sufficient to refer to previous presentations. This brief shall be notified for 10 or 5 days to the other party according to whether it refers to ordinary or summary proceedings.” Decree Law 7425/69, Code of Civil and Commercial Procedure of the province of Buenos Aires, art. 260 (file of annexes to the brief with final written arguments of the State, available at http://www.gob.gba.gov.ar/legislacion/legislacion/l-7425.html). 219 Cf. Brief of August 9, 2012 (merits file, annex G, folio 484), and decision of August 16, 2012 (merits file, annex G, folio 486). 46