other hand, the Court were to declare that all effective domestic remedies had been exhausted or did not exist, it would be prejudging the merits in a manner detrimental to the State.” 39 57. In addition, regarding the expression used in this Judgment concerning the analysis of “merely a matter of admissibility,” 40 the Court, in its consistent case law, has understood that: First, the Court has indicated that the failure to exhaust remedies is merely a matter of admissibility and that the State that alleges this must indicate the domestic remedies that must be exhausted, and also prove that these remedies are effective. 41 Second, to be timely, the objection asserting the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be made in the first measure taken by the State during the proceedings before the Commission; to the contrary, it is presumed that the State has tacitly waived presenting this argument. Third, the defendant State may expressly or tacitly waive citing the failure to exhaust domestic remedies 42 (underlining added). 58. In this case, the matters of “mere admissibility,” as has been understood by this Court’s case law, refer to the presentation and indication at the appropriate procedural stage of the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission. However, such matters cannot be analyzed independently of the substantive matters, especially when allegations of presumed violations of due process and judicial guarantees are involved because, as the Commission indicated, “the exceptions to the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies established in Article 46(2) of the Convention are closely related to the determination of possible violations of certain rights recognized therein, such as the guarantees of access to justice.” 43 59. Separating the aspects that relate strictly to admissibility from those on merits, as the Judgment seeks to do, is a contrived issue in this case because, in order to decide whether the exceptions to the rule of the exhaustion of domestic remedies apply, it is unavoidable to analyze substantive aspects related to “due process of law,” “access to remedies under domestic law” or to the “unwarranted delay” in such remedies, exceptions established in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Article 46(2), closely related to the rights established in Articles 8 and 25 of the Pact of San José, which motivated specific arguments by the parties, and their dispute. 60. In this regard, in the Case of Salvador Chiriboga v. Ecuador, owing to the fact that the Commission’s filing of remedies in the proceedings before the inter-American system was directly related to the merits, the Inter-American Court decided, as it has in many cases, that “[t]he argument related to the unwarranted delay in some of the judicial proceedings instituted by the Salvador Chiriboga brothers and the State, […] would be 39 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 95. 40 Cf. para. 101 of the Judgment. 41 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88; Case of Nogueira Carvalho et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of November 28, 2006. Series C No. 161, para. 51, and Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 64. 42 Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary objections. Judgment of June 26, 1987. Series C No. 1, para. 88; Case of Nogueira Carvalho et al. v. Brazil. Preliminary objections and merits. Judgment of November 28, 2006. Series C No. 161, para. 51, and Case of Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile. Judgment of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 154, para. 64. 43 Para. 101 of the Judgment. 14