21 In the case of the Mapiripán Massacre, the Court valued the information submitted and considered that the State "complied with the reparation measure to design and development of human rights and international humanitarian law training programs, on the understanding that these are permanent programs.”25 In the case of the Ituango Massacres, the Tribunal, in relation to said compliance, indicated that “given the same reparation measure is being analyzed and for the reasons indicated [in the Order of the case of the Mapiripán Massacre], it consider[ed] that the State ha[d] complied with the terms of operative paragraph 21 of the Judgment” regarding the measures of human rights training.26 78. 79. The Court values that the training measures ordered and regarded as complied with in the cases of the Mapiripán Massacre and the Ituango Massacre make it possible to achieve the same training measure objective ordered in the case of La Rochela Massacre. The measure strives to contribute to the prevention of violations by means of human rights education aimed at members of the Armed Forces. 80. Based on the foregoing considerations, and since in the cases of the Mapiripán Massacre and the Ituango Massacres the Court declared compliance with the training measures in the understanding that the programs implemented by the State would be permanent, and the representatives did not present any observations on the matter, and the Commission valued the programs being implemented by the State, this Tribunal concludes that Colombia has complied with operative paragraph twelve of the Judgment. * * * Payment of compensation and reimbursement of costs and expenses 81. In relation to the obligation to pay the amounts set as pecuniary damages, nonpecuniary damages, and costs and expenses (operative paragraph thirteen of the Judgment), the State informed that, “by means of the Orders of August and October 2008, the Interior and Justice Ministry paid compensation to the victims’ next-of-kin” and it attached copies of the three Orders. By means of a brief of April 15, 2009, (supra Having Seen 9), the State acknowledged that a tax, known as “four per thousand,” was deducted from the compensatory amounts that were deposited in the victims’ bank accounts; the tax is a levy on the transactions conducted by the financial system, which is collected by the financial institutions and subsequently forwarded to the State. Colombia stated that “the financial institutions with which the beneficiaries of the compensatory amounts have their personal bank accounts, through which the amounts ordered in the [J]udgment were paid, had collected the tax." Therefore, it reported that the Interior and Justice Ministry (body in charge of making the payment) contacted the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales [Internal Revenue and Customs Service] (DIAN) and made inquiries about the "proceeding to reimburse unduly collected taxes." Furthermore, it indicated that said ministry “has submitted the information provided by DIAN to reimburse the taxes paid by each of the beneficiaries who had requested the reimbursement" and that it will send this information to the representatives. In addition, it stated that “no communication has been presented on the outcome of the measures adopted or whether that they had had an adverse effect on the beneficiaries” and "if the beneficiaries receive a negative response from the financial institutions in charge of 25 Case of the “Maripirán Massacre” V. Colombia, supra nota 8, Considering Clause 64. 26 Case of the Ituango Massacres V. Colombia; supra note 8, Considering Clause fifty.