rather, to “verify”29 whether, at the time the petition was lodged, the requirement had been met. This becomes clear in view of Article 36 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure, that once “it has considered the positions of the parties, the Commission shall make a decision on the admissibility of the matter.” There can be no question, then, that the moment when the Commission rules on the admissibility of the petition is different from the moment when the petition is lodged or completed. This is patently evident since the Commission’s Rules of Procedure call for an “initial processing”30 of the petition, for it to be “registered”31 and its “relevant parts”32 forwarded to the State; it is only after the State responds that the Commission examines admissibility, and for this purpose, it “verifies”33, that is, confirms, that the requirements have been met, including the requirement for prior exhaustion of domestic remedies. To summarize, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission do not stipulate that domestic remedies need to have been exhausted at the time it rules on admissibility of the petition. Instead, it says that this is when the Commission “verifies” whether remedies were initiated and exhausted beforehand, or whether it was not necessary; that is, it performs a second review of whether the petition is consistent with the Convention, comparing it with the provisions of the Convention regarding the requirements that need to be met for it to be either “admitted” or dismissed. As added emphasis, it is enough to reiterate that if it were not mandatory to have exhausted domestic remedies before formulating the petition, it would therefore be permissible, for a certain amount of time while the petition is being lodged (recognizing that under many circumstances, this can be very lengthy), for a single case to be in process simultaneously before both the domestic courts and the international jurisdiction. Such a situation would clearly render meaningless the provisions of the above-mentioned paragraph two of the preamble and even the overall rule on prior exhaustion of domestic remedies. The interAmerican jurisdiction would, in such a case, cease to be reinforcing or complementing the domestic jurisdiction, and instead would replace it, or at least be wielded as a pressure tactic, which was certainly not the intent of the Convention. Indeed, under this hypothesis, it could become an incentive, even a perverse one, to take submissions to the Commission even when this requirement has not been met, in hopes that it can be met before the Commission rules on its admissibility, which is also inconsistent with the object or purposes of the Convention. 29 Art. 31(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 30 Art. 29 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 31 Idem. 32 Art. 30(2) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 33 Art. 31(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission. 11