“[t]he Court therefore holds that the State filed its objection at the correct time”36 “during the admissibility stage before the Commission”37, and more specifically, in its petition.38 The judgment also says that the petition was lodged “as provided in Articles 46(1)(a) of the American Convention, in keeping with Article 31 of the [Commission’s] Rules of Procedure,” and because “the relevant remedy had not been exhausted.”39 The second comment about the judgment on this matter is that it offers only two other explanations as grounds for the decision to deny this objection raised by the State. The first is the argument that it would be “inconsistent to pursue a process before the inter-American system when the criminal proceedings for the same facts were still in progress in the domestic courts. The Court would recall in this regard that the American Convention itself expressly allows for a petition to be declared admissible under certain assumptions, even if the prior exhaustion of domestic remedies has not yet been established at the time the admissibility report is issued. Adopting the position held by the State would mean removing all content and useful effect from the provisions of Article 46(2) of the American Convention.”40 Instead of settling the difference between the parties concerning the situation covered in Article 46(1)(a) of the Convention, as was expressly requested, the judgment applies the provisions of Article 46(2)(c), which had not even been cited in the petition and therefore could not be addressed in the State’s response, much less considered by the Commission or in the judgment. As a result, the judgment adheres to the same reasoning as the Commission, that the requirement for prior exhaustion of domestic remedies should have been met as of the time the Commission made its decision on admissibility, and not when the petition was first lodged, thus discarding the notion that the exceptions to the requirement should have been raised or argued concerning the petition as “lodged” or in the finalization of the process, and not afterwards, or even less so, by the Commission. Furthermore, in so doing, the judgment ignores the State’s express, direct affirmation and request that “petition 136/2003 be found inadmissible pursuant to Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention and Article 31 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission”, without any explanation as to why, and despite the fact that the request is included in the background information, as was stated earlier. The judgment’s second thesis to justify denial of the State’s preliminary objection is the State’s earlier recognition during the course of the proceedings. It says, “[t]he Court would respond to the Commission’s decision to apply the exception set forth in [Article 46(2)(c) of the Convention] when it issued the Admissibility Report by noting that at a later date, in 2011, 36 Para. 50 of the judgment. 37 Para. 49 of the judgment. 38 Para. 50 of the judgment. 39 Idem. 40 Para. 52 of the judgment. 15