IV. ON COMPENSATORY INDEMNIFICATION FOR NONPECUNIARY DAMAGE IN THE INSTANT CASE 18. I agree that the judgment is, per se, a form of reparation, as the Court has held since 1989. 38 I further believe, however, that in the instant case, it is not enough, and an amount should have been awarded in equity for the nonpecuniary damage inflicted on family members for the violations that were adjudged and declared in the judgment. The Court’s customary rationale has been that damage caused by a human rights violation reaches beyond the direct victim and also touches family members because of the close tie they share. 19. It should be understood that, even though the Court’s usual model for comprehensive reparation includes a broad spectrum of measures of reparation, there are certain forms of violation that, by their very nature, preclude restitutio in integrum; it thus becomes essential to award compensation as a way to offset the damage caused by the arbitrary taking of life. 20. I would particularly like to emphasize in this case the seriousness of the acts for which the State was found internationally responsible: the extrajudicial execution of a person who was out of combat and who, the last time he was seen alive, was in State custody. 39 Furthermore, serious irregularities were confirmed in the handling of the scene and the removal of the bodies, as well as shortcomings in the performance of the first autopsies. 40 21. In the case of Meléndez Cueva and Peceros Pedraza, moreover, the bodies had not yet been positively identified when the burials were ordered. Nor were the families notified before they were buried.41 The Court also recognized the damage inflicted on Edgar Odón Cruz Acuña because of his brother’s death, which had personal repercussions and triggered feelings of fear and helplessness, as was stated and confirmed in the judgment.42 22. The Court also found that the judicial process before the Peruvian courts did not take place within a reasonable period, and the State cannot demonstrate that it has taken measures necessary to locate one of the accused who is currently a fugitive; as such, the whole truth about the events surrounding the extrajudicial execution of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez is still not known, according to the judgment,43 and also in view of the findings by the Supreme Court of Peru, to the effect that “there are still certain details about the facts, associated with victim Cruz Sánchez, that can and must be clarified through a more intense line of investigation.” 44 Reparations and Costs. Judgment of December 3, 2001. Series C No. 88; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2005. Series C No. 137; Case of J. v. Peru. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 27, 2013. Series C No. 275, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra. 38 I/A Court HR. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Reparations and Costs, supra, para. 36. 39 Paras. 316 to 319 of the judgment. 40 Para. 431 of the judgment. 41 Paras. 172 and 371 of the judgment. 42 Para. 450 of the judgment. Para. 429 of the judgment. This case is somewhat unlike other cases in which the Court has found that the right to know the truth is “subsumed” in the right of victims or their family members to have the competent bodies of the State clarify violations and attach the pertinent responsibilities; in the instant case, the Court did not subsume the rights in this way, but instead found that there was no need to give a specific ruling on violation of the right to know the truth, given the violations already declared and the particular details of the case (para. 430 of the judgment). 43 44 Para. 429 of the judgment. 6