of the merits. It therefore clarified that the analysis of unwarranted delay, conducted during the admissibility stage, had been performed as prima facie, while the standard of a reasonable period pertains to the analysis of the merits. The Commission further argued that the evaluation of whether to apply objections based on Article 46(2) of the American Convention should take place in advance, separately from the discussion of the merits, using a different standard from the one employed for assessing violation of Articles 8 and 25 of the Convention. It held, in this regard, that the State had not supplied enough information during the admissibility stage, and therefore the report examined “the passage of time since the facts occurred and the lack of progress with the investigation in the ordinary courts.” The Commission noted in closing that the process against Fujimori Fujimori had formally begun with criminal charges lodged in 2007, that is, 10 years after the facts, and was still awaiting a decision. The Commission also addressed the State’s argument concerning the alleged inconsistency as a process followed its course through the inter-American system while, at the same time, the domestic criminal trial was still underway. It emphasized that it was specifically for cases such as this, when the facts date back more than 15 years and investigations have been open for more than 10 years without a final verdict, that the Convention allows for exceptions to the failure to exhaust domestic remedies, and added that, “in over half of the cases before it, the Court […] has applied these exceptions during the admissibility stage before the [Commission]” and that the Court has examined the reasonableness of the period in the merits. It therefore asked the Court to deny the preliminary objection as inadmissible. 47. The representatives explained that in their understanding, the State's arguments would apply only to the objection on unwarranted delay in the ordinary criminal courts; the objection should not be considered, based on the principle of estoppel, as the Peruvian State “recognized its responsibility for the excessive time taken in trying the criminal case.” They argued that the objection now being lodged by the State contradicted the earlier position, and the State was therefore barred from presenting it and it should be denied. They further argued that while the process before the military courts had been finalized at the time the Admissibility Report was issued and therefore could be considered to have been exhausted, they did not consider it an appropriate remedy and “therefore, it did not need to be exhausted.” They maintained that the exceptions to the requirement for exhaustion of remedies allowed under Article 46(2)(a) and (c) of the Convention was, in fact, applicable to the process underway in the ordinary courts, even though it was not yet final. They noted that “at the time of the facts and for several years thereafter, Peru did not have minimum guarantees of due process,” and that the criminal proceedings undertaken to investigate the facts of the instant case in the ordinary jurisdiction had taken place within this same context and presented the same defects. They added that the exception to the provisions of Article 46(2)(a) of the Convention was perfectly applicable, given the “situation of widespread impunity for cases of serious human rights violations committed as part of the fight against terrorism.” They noted in closing that the State itself was responsible for the unwarranted delay, because before opening the proceedings in the ordinary courts, the State itself had committed actions and omissions intended to “interfere with the investigation and had therefore contributed to the delay.” In summary, they asked the Court to deny the preliminary objection raised by the State. Considerations of the Court 48. Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention states that the admissibility of a petition or communication lodged by the Inter-American Commission in accordance with Articles 44 or 45 is subject to the requirement that the remedies under domestic law have been pursued and