alleged victims had brought new facts in its pleadings and motions brief that the Commission had not held as proven in its Report on the Merits, specifically, facts that ultimately could point to a violation of the right to personal integrity for family members of the alleged victims. It therefore asked the Court to remove from the process several facts intended to prove alleged violation of the right to personal integrity for family members of the alleged victims, “given that they were not considered by the [Commission] or discussed during the time the […] petition was being processed.” The State transcribed the relevant sections of the facts and maintained that, while the facts were indeed related, they were “substantially broader” than those established by the Commission, and thus could not be considered “material that explains, sets the context or sheds light on” the facts proven by the Commission in its Report on the Merits. 86. The Commission emphasized that the State had recognized that the facts about family members, submitted by the representatives, were “related” to those brought by the Commission. It further highlighted that the facts raised by the representatives merely supplied supplementary information about some of the family members identified by the Commission and who, it concluded, had experienced violations for which the State was responsible. 87. The representatives clarified that the State had recognized that the facts to which it was objecting were related to those included in the Commission’s Report on the Merits and therefore, far from standing as new facts, instead further developed or explained points already held as proven by the Commission. They also explained that the facts contained in their pleadings and motions brief to which the State objected fell into two categories: (i) those that show who the alleged victims of extrajudicial execution were and provide relevant background details, included merely as context information, and (ii) those revealing the way family members of the alleged victims learned about the alleged execution and the various processes they undertook to obtain justice. According to the representatives, these facts had been included in general terms in the Commission’s Report on the Merits, and the pleadings and motions brief provided certain details about how these facts had occurred. The representatives also held that, because both parties had received ample opportunity to exercise their right of defense, “it would be utterly untrue” to claim that these facts had not been aired in the relevant process. They therefore asked the Court to dismiss the State’s arguments. Considerations of the Court 88. The Court already decided to deny the State’s “[o]bjection, based on a legality review of Report on the Merits 66/11, regarding the identification of alleged victims and human rights not included in Admissibility Report 13/04”, that would have removed the family members of Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva and Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza as alleged victims of the claimed violation of the right to personal integrity (supra paras. 59 to 69). 89. The State’s arguments on “inadmissibility of the representatives of the alleged victims bringing new facts into the process before the Inter-American Court,” were intended to bar certain facts raised by the representatives to prove the alleged violation of the right to personal integrity of family members of the alleged victims, to which the State objected under the argument that they entailed new facts that the Commission had not held as proven in its Report on the Merits No. 66/11. 90. This Court has established that the factual framework of the proceedings before the Court consists of the facts contained in the Report on Admissibility and Merits submitted to its consideration. Consequently, it is not admissible for the parties to argue new facts that diverge from those contained in the said report, without prejudice to including those that may explain,