initiatives intended to consolidate peace and harmony among Peruvian citizens.” 91 The report was presented to the different branches of the State, which acknowledged its conclusions and recommendations and acted in consequence, adopting policies that reflected the significance accorded to this institutional document. 92 The report is a key point of reference, as it offers a comprehensive view of the armed conflict in Peru. The Commission, the State and the representatives in the instant case all based their arguments on the context by pointing to the CVR report, which has been included in the evidence file of the case. The Court will therefore use the report as a crucial piece of evidence on the political and historical context in place at the time of the facts. 140. In previous cases, the Court has recognized that, starting in the early 1980s and until the end of 2000, Peru experienced a conflict between armed groups and members of the police and the military forces.93 According to the final CVR report, the armed groups in the conflict included the Communist Party of Peru (hereinafter “Shining Path”) and the Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru, hereinafter MRTA), whose members were known as emerretistas or “MRTistas”. Shining Path decided to launch a socalled “people’s war” against the State to impose its own ideals of political and social organization in the country,94 which “was the fundamental motivation for unleashing domestic armed conflict in Peru.95 141. The organization Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement was founded in 1982, inspired by leftist guerrilla groups in other countries of the region, with the goal of pursuing armed struggle to achieve its purposes. 96 At the beginning of its “people’s revolutionary war” in 1984, the MRTA became one of the factors in the insecurity that Peru experienced for several years and the violation of the fundamental rights of Peruvians. 97 The CVR emphasized that actions attributable to the MRTA included hostage-taking and kidnappings for political or economic reasons, which had a particular impact on Peruvian society, given the methods and conditions by which they were carried out.98 91 Case of Baldeón García v. Peru, supra, para. 72(1), and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, para. 50. Cf. Case of Cantoral Huamaní and García Santa Cruz v. Peru, supra, paras. 89 and 91, and Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, para. 50. 92 Cf. Case of the Miguel Castro Castro Prison v. Peru, supra, para. 197.1, and Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, para. 51. 93 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume II, chapter 1.1, The Communist Party of Peru Shining Path, pp. 29 to 31, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. 94 Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, Volume II, Chapter 1.1, the Communist Party of Peru Shining Path, p. 127, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. 95 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume II, chapter 1.4, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, pp. 385 to 387, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. 96 The MRTA conducted such actions as “seizing” radio stations, schools, markets and low-income neighborhoods, theft of delivery trucks belonging to major commercial companies, attacks on trucks filled with essential goods, attacks on water and electric companies, attacks on police stations and the homes of members of government, selective assassination of high-level public officials and business leaders, execution of indigenous leaders, and several deaths due to the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victims, with the string of terror in these cases continuing over a considerable length of time. They also kidnapped journalists and businesspeople to obtain large sums of ransom money. The hostages were kept hidden during their captivity in so-called “people’s prisons” (small, unhealthy spaces). Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume II, chapter 1.4, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, and volume VIII, General conclusions, p. 320, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. See also, Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, paras. 52 and 53. 97 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VI, chapter 1.7, Kidnapping and hostage-taking, p. 547, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. See also, Case of Espinoza Gonzáles v. Peru, supra, paras. 52 and 53. 98