the Japanese ambassador.104 The MRTA members were: Néstor Fortunato Cerpa Cartolini, alias “Evaristo”, commander of the operation; Roli Rojas Fernández, alias “Árabe”; Eduardo Nicolás Cruz Sánchez, alias “Tito”; Luz Dina Villoslada Rodríguez, alias “Gringa”; Alejandro Huamaní Contreras; Adolfo Trigoso Torres; Víctor Luber Luis Cáceres Taboada; Iván Meza Espíritu, alias “Pitin” or “Bebé”; Artemio Shingari Rosque, alias “Alex” or “Coné”; Herma Luz Meléndez Cueva, alias “Cynthia” or “Melissa”; Bosco Honorato Salas Huamán; Víctor Salomón Peceros Pedraza; Edgar Huamaní Cabrera, and an unidentified person. 105 146. The MRTA group, equipped with such military gear as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers, pistols, revolvers, hand grenades, explosives and gas masks, 106 entered the building next door to the Japanese ambassador’s residence and, after blowing open a hole in the wall, entered the residence, overpowered the security personnel, and took all the guests hostage. 107 C. Negotiations between the government and the guerrillas 147. The government responded to the situation that same day, December 17, 1996, issuing Executive Order 063-96-DE-CCFFAA to declare a state of emergency in the Lima district of San Isidro.108 Then President of Peru Alberto Fujimori Fujimori called an emergency midnight meeting with his cabinet of ministers. Minister of Education Domingo Palermo was appointed to negotiate with the MRTA rebels. 109 One hour later, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) succeeded in making contact with the guerrillas and offered its services of Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 720 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 6), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13411). 104 Cf. Ruling by the Transitory Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on an appeal to vacate judgment, 3521-2012 July 24, 2013 (evidence file, volume XXI, helpful evidence, folio 14667). See also, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 720 (evidence file, volume I, annex I to the case submission brief, folio 6), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13411 and 13412). 105 According to Peru’s judicial authorities, they were carrying “firearms such as Kalashnikov rifles (AK-47), AKM 5.56 mm, UZI 9 mm machine pistols, RPG-7 rocket launchers (Rocket Propelled Grenades), Russian anti-tank bazookas, 9mm handguns, revolvers, “pineapple” and “avocado” grenades, explosives and gas masks (see three top images and 34 lower images from photograph album II), walkie-talkie communication devices, door sealing mines, improvised booby-traps for windows, and other military equipment.” Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13412). 106 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 720 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 6), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13412 and 13413). 107 Cf. Ruling by the Transitory Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on an appeal to vacate judgment, 3521-2012 July 24, 2013 (evidence file, volume XXI, helpful evidence, folios 14681 to 14682). The ruling clarifies that this was the first of a sequence of executive orders extending the state of emergency in the Lima district of San Isidro for the whole time the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru was in the hands of the MRTA. 108 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 721 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 7). 109