control, to evacuate the wounded, first the hostages and members of participating security forces, and later the MRTA guerrillas. Finally, any remaining uninjured persons would be evacuated. The action would be backed by the support and evacuation unit, providing treatment and triangulating and evacuating the hostages and MRTA rebels. During this stage, prosecutors appointed by Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar (CSJM) Supreme Council of Military Justice would join the action and enter the residence of the Japanese ambassador with a warrant.146 159. Intelligence work for the operation was under the charge of Vladimiro Montesinos Torres (supra para. 157) by order of the President. Vladimiro Montesinos Torres assigned Army Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Edmundo Huamán Ascurra the task of activating information obtained secretly from inside the residence, setting up wiretaps, introducing microphones and recording the activities of the MRTA guerrillas and hostages, designing the replica of the the Japanese ambassador’s residence, taking pictures and films, and providing logistic support to the participants in the military operation, 147 while Army Lieutenant Colonel Jesús Salvador Zamudio Aliaga was assigned to build the tunnels and provide security for houses neighboring the ambassador’s residence.148 E. Execution of “Plan of Operation Nipón 96” or Operation “Chavín de Huántar” 160. Executive Order 020-DE-CCFFAA was issued on April 16, 1997, extending the state of emergency in the Lima district of San Isidro, where the residence of the Japanese ambassador to Peru was located (supra para. 147).149 161. The President of Peru issued an order on April 22, 1997 to initiate Rescue Operation “Chavín de Huántar”,150 which began that same day at 3:23 p.m.151 Hostages Army Lieutenant Colonel Roberto Rosendo Fernández Frantzen and Navy Vice-Admiral Luis Giampietri Rojas had recently sent messages to the intelligence team using high-technology devices secretly placed Cf. Plan of Operation B. “NIPON” 96 / “TENAZ” (Tenaz Patrol), January 1997, p. 6 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2 to the case submission brief, folio 37). 146 Cf. Ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folios 13420 to 13421). 147 Cf. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume VII, chapter 2.66, Extrajudicial executions at the residence of the Japanese ambassador (1997), p. 724 (evidence file, volume I, annex 1 to the case submission brief, folio 10). 148 Cf. Ruling by the Transitory Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice on an appeal to vacate judgment, 3521-2012 July 24, 2013 (evidence file, volume XXI, helpful evidence, folios 14681 to 14682). 149 Two conditions were required before the operation could begin: (1) that no fewer than seven or eight guerrillas and 50% of those who held command positions be occupied playing foosball in the living room on the ground floor, and no hostage be on the ground floor, and (2) that the door to the patio, giving access to the second floor, could be opened easily. Cf. Report 01/1st Div FFEE Operation “Chavín de Huántar” (hostage rescue operation) April 30, 1997, p. 15 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2.a to the case submission brief, folio 56); Annex 02, Report on Operation “Tenaz Patrol”, April 30, 1997, p. 6 (merits file, volume II, annex 7 offered by the State for planning the exercise of “reconstruction of the facts,” folio 1022), and declaration by Carlos Alberto Tello Aliaga before a federal attestor, January 29, 2014 (evidence file, volume XXX, affidavits, folios 20734 to 20744). 150 Cf. Report 01/1st Div FFEE Operation “Chavín de Huántar” (hostage rescue operation) April 30, 1997, p. 16 (evidence file, volume I, annex 2.a to the case submission brief, folio 57), and Annex 02, Report on Operation “Tenaz Patrol”, April 30, 1997, p. 6 (merits file, volume II, annex 7 offered by the State for planning the exercise of “reconstruction of the facts”, folio 1022). See also, Declaration by José Daniel Williams Zapata before a public attestor, January 29, 2014 (evidence file, volume XXX, affidavits, folio 20723), and ruling by the Third Special Criminal Chamber of the Superior Court of Lima, October 15, 2012 (evidence file, volume XX, annexed to the representatives’ observations on the State’s preliminary objections, folio 13505). 151