members had dropped out and taken refuge under the Law of Surrender, facilitating the capture of other MRTA members. This led to the breakdown of the MRTA Northeastern Front, leaving the remaining members isolated in the Central Front (province of Chanchamayo, department of Junín). Working from there, the National MRTA Directorate designed its final action: seizing the residence of the Japanese ambassador, [with] the intention of swapping the hostages for its prisoners. A commando made up of 14 MRTA guerrillas assaulted the residence on December 17 and took 72 hostages who, after being held for 126 days, were rescued in an operation known as “Chavín de Huantar”. All the guerrillas died. This outcome marked the beginning of the end of the MRTA. 331 [emphasis added] 269. The Court would note, in this connection, that the actions of the MRTA entailed the taking of hostages, the inappropriate use of an ambulance to evade police control (supra para. 145), entering the residence of the Japanese ambassador, and holding the guests, some of whom would spend four months in captivity, in exchange for certain counterpart demands they were making of the State (supra para. 148). It should be recalled, in this regard, that such actions are illegal “wherever and by whoever committed”. 332 It is equally relevant to emphasize that the ambassador’s residence where the hostage-taking occurred was under international protection,333 as were the diplomatic334 and consular335 officials. 270. In short, the Court agrees with the parties and the Commission and finds that, given that the hostages were taken on the occasion and in the midst of a domestic armed conflict, 336 it will proceed as it has on other occasions. 337 Because Common Article 3 of the Geneva Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Informe Final, 2003, volume II, chapter 1.4, Túpac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, pp. 430 to 431, available in Spanish at www.cverdad.org.pe/ifinal/index.php. 331 Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, 1949. See also, International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I, edited by Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, 2007, Rule 96, available at https://www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarianlaw-i-icrc-eng.pdf 332 See Articles 22 and 30(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, done on April 18, 1961, and entered into force on April 24, 1964. Peru has been a party to the Convention since December 18, 1968. These provisions state, “The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. [...] The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity. [...] The private residence of a diplomatic agent shall enjoy the same inviolability and protection as the premises of the mission.” 333 See Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: “The person of a diplomatic agent shall be inviolable. He shall not be liable to any form of arrest or detention. The receiving State shall treat him with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on his person, freedom or dignity.” 334 See Article 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, done on April 24, 1963, and entered into force on March 19, 1967: “The receiving State shall treat consular officers with due respect and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on their person, freedom or dignity.” Peru has been a party to the Convention since February 17, 1978. 335 It should be recalled that international humanitarian law must be applied by the parties in the context of non-international armed conflicts, provided that the facts correspond to situations that occur because of and during the conflict. Cf. Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, footnote 254. 336 Cf. Case of the Ituango Massacres v. Colombia. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of July 1, 2006. Series C No. 148, para. 179, and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia, supra, paras. 21 to 25 and 187. 337