2 2. On December 29, 2010, the State submitted a request for interpretation under Articles 67 of the Convention and 68 of the Rules of Procedure. Mexico asked the Court to clarify the meaning and scope of: a) “Paragraph 105 [of the judgment], directly related to paragraphs 104, 106 and 161 thereof, in order to clarify whether the indication determining the participation of soldiers in the acts perpetrated against Mrs. Fernández Ortega [constitutes] prejudgment of those allegedly responsible, as regards their number and specific status as military personnel,”3 and b) “Paragraph 161 of the judgment and, if appropriate, clarify whether its interpretation of the involvement of the military jurisdiction in the investigation into the facts constitutes prejudgment with regard to those probably responsible for the violations indicated in that paragraph.” 3. On January 12, 2011, under the provisions of Article 68(2) of the Rules of Procedure and on the instructions of the President of the Court, the Secretariat of the 3 The paragraphs mentioned by the State indicate: 104. Given that more than eight years have passed since the facts occurred, the State has not provided any evidence in the proceedings of the present case that would contradict that the rape of Mrs. Rosendo Cantu took place, the Court considers it reasonable to grant weight to the evidence and the presumptions that arise from the case file […] regarding the occurrence of a rape by the soldiers against Mrs. Rosendo Cantú. To conclude the contrary would mean that the Court permits the State to seek protection in their negligence and ineffective criminal investigation so as to diminish their responsibility for the violation of Article 5 of the Convention.3 105. As indicated by the Court since its first contentious case, for an international Court the criteria for the assessment of evidence is less formal than in the domestic legal system. Its procedure, being one of an international Court, presents particularities and characteristics which pertain only to it, to which all the procedural elements of domestic courts do not automatically apply to it. International protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice. For the effects and purposes of the judgment before this Court, the elements of proof that arise from the body of evidence are sufficient to derive the aforementioned conclusions. The standards or requirements of proof are not those of a criminal court, given that it is not the Court’s role to determine individual responsibilities or to assess, under those criteria, the same evidence. 106. Based on the above, the Court finds it proved that Mrs. Rosendo Cantú was the victim of acts that constitute rape, committed by two soldiers in the presence of six others at a stream near her home where she went to wash clothes. 161. In no case does the rape of someone by military personnel bear any relationship to the military discipline or mission. To the contrary, the offense committed by military personnel against Mrs. Rosendo Cantú affected juridical rights protected by domestic law and the American Convention, such as the victim’s personal integrity and dignity. It is evident that such conduct is openly contrary to the obligations to respect and to protect human rights, and consequently, is excluded from the competence of the military jurisdiction. Based on the foregoing, the Court concludes that the intervention of the military justice system in the preliminary investigation of the rape was contrary to the parameters concerning the exceptional and restrictive nature of that system and involved the application of the military jurisdiction that functioned without taking into account the nature of the acts involved. This conclusion is valid in the present case, even though the incident is only at the investigation stage by the Military Public Prosecutor’s Office. As revealed by the criteria indicated above, the incompatibility of the American Convention with the intervention of the military justice system in this type of case does not refer merely to the act of prosecution, which is the responsibility of a court, but essentially to the investigation itself, because this procedure constitutes the beginning and the necessary grounds for the subsequent intervention of an incompetent court. Based on the above, the Court finds that the State violated the rights to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection established in Articles 8(1) and 25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Mrs. Rosendo Cantú. As in previous cases when it has found that the military criminal jurisdiction is not competent, the Court considers that it is not necessary to rule on the other arguments concerning the independence and impartiality of the military justice system or the possible violation, based on the same facts, under other Inter-American instruments.