52. In response, the Commission emphasized that “the State had not contested the indigenous status of the community either in the context of its claims at the domestic level or during the inter-American procedure before the Commission.” In addition, the State had not questioned the indigenous nature of the community in its answering brief before the Inter-American Court. Moreover, the [Commission] noted that the definitive ownership title granted to the community by the State in 1999 was based on Article 14 of ILO Convention 169.” Consequently, the Commission argued that, owing to the substantial changes in the State’s position before the Court, the principle of estoppel should be applied. 53. The representatives pointed out that “[t]his change of position by the State […] entails converting the matter into a case of an individual nature and of civil or agrarian law that would prejudice [the Punta Piedra community]; for this reason, we consider that the rule of [estoppel] should be applied and the indigenous nature of the Garifuna people be considered proven. A.2 Considerations of the Court 54. The Court notes that in the 1999 definitive ownership title, the State indicated that the legal grounds for granting the territory included ILO Convention 169. 28 Also, in its Merits Report, the Commission indicated that “[t]he indigenous nature of the Garifuna people is not in dispute in the instant case.” Then, in its answering brief before the Court, the State indicated that it “recognizes that the indigenous and AfroHonduran peoples, including the Punta Piedra Garifuna community and its members, continue to face serious challenges […].” However, following the public hearing held on September 2, 2014, the State argued, for the first time during the procedure before the inter-American system, that the Punta Piedra Garifuna community was not an original people of Honduras or of the region and therefore, could not be considered an indigenous people or invoke the right to ancestral lands. 55. Based on the above, the Court recalls that the logical and adequate functioning of the inter-American human rights system signifies that, as a “system,” the parties must present their positions and information on the facts coherently and in keeping with the principles of good faith and legal certainty in order to ensure an adequate substantiation of the cases for the other parties and the inter-American organs. 29 In addition, under international practice, when a party to a litigation adopts a certain position that results in detriment to himself or benefits the opposing party, he may not then, based on the principle of estoppel, assume another position contradictory to the first. 30 56. Accordingly, pursuant to the principles of estoppel, good faith, procedural equality and legal certainty, the Court considers that, in this case, the State cannot indigenous and Afro-Honduran or Afro-descendant people. In this context, it found it pertinent to clarify that “Garifuna communities are considered to be differentiated communities but not original indigenous people.” 28 Cf. Definitive ownership title of December 6, 1999 (evidence file, folio 26). 29 Cf. Case of Acevedo Jaramillo et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of February 7, 2006. Series C No. 144, para. 167 and Case of the Santo Domingo Massacre v. Colombia. Preliminary objections, merits and reparations. Judgment of November 30, 2012. Series C No. 259, para. 144. 30 Cf. Case of Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru. Preliminary objections. Judgment of December 11, 1991. Series C No. 13, para. 29 and Case of Garcia and family members v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 29, 2012. Series C No. 258, para. 31. 17