actions, and had allowed violence to occur by failing to comply with its obligations. They added that, “regarding the safeguard in favor of third parties that was eliminated from the second title, the Court should apply the principle of the continuity of States (or identity of States), since the said clause was eliminated by an administrative decision of the Honduran State signifying real progress in the recognition of indigenous rights in Honduras, rather than by a decision of a former Minister in his personal capacity by which the State sought “to disregard its final decisions and ignore the ancestral, ownership and conventional rights of the Punta Piedra Garifuna, [which] would represent an unacceptable regression.” 161. The State acknowledged the need to ensure the peaceful possession of the territories of the indigenous communities by freeing them of encumbrances and, therefore, pursuant to the laws of Honduras, it has the obligation to free the area occupied by the inhabitants of the village of Rio Miel of encumbrances. The State indicated that it had tried to clear the title granted to the Punta Piedra Garifuna community and, to this end, on two occasions, it had agreed on the value of the improvements to be paid to the Rio Miel inhabitants. It indicated that, currently, it was unaware of the value of the improvements that, over their 20-year occupation of those lands, had been made by the Rio Miel inhabitants. However, it had planned to again update the appraisal so as to be able to propose payment for the improvements, and to purchase land in another location to resettle them and try to avoid outbreaks of violence between the two communities. Subsequently, in its final arguments, it underlined that “the Honduran State committed a deprivation of rights” by amending the title granting the community an expansion, because this constituted a violation of the Rio Miel inhabitants’ right of occupation and, therefore, of the right granting them full ownership of the said land. The Honduran State insisted that it had not violated the right to property of the Punta Piedra community because it was not occupying the land claimed when it was titled and is not occupying it at this moment either; therefore, the community has no right to the land they claim being freed of encumbrances. B. Considerations of the Court 162. First, the Court repeats that, as established in the section on the State’s partial acknowledgement of responsibility, this produced legal effects as regards the violation of the right to property, recognized in Article 21 of the Convention (supra para. 45). However, in this chapter, the Court will analyze the arguments of the parties and the Commission in order to determine its scope. In addition, the dispute with regard to Articles 1(1) and 2 of the Convention persists, and this will be examined together with the arguments in the corresponding section (infra para. 203 to 211). Also, pursuant to the prior consideration (supra para. 56) and proven facts (supra para. 91), the standards for indigenous and tribal rights are applicable to the Punta Piedra Garifuna community. 163. Furthermore, three main disputes exist in light of the position of the parties and the Commission. The first consists in determining the scope of the State’s obligation to ensure the use and enjoyment of the property titled to the Punta Piedra Garifuna community vis-à-vis third parties, owing to its alleged inability to possess its traditional territory peacefully; the second relates to the compatibility of the applicable domestic laws with the American Convention; and the third relates to the moment at which the right to prior consultation should be implemented. It is worth noting that, in this case, the Commission did not present the situation of the Rio Miel inhabitants – as a population settled in the territory – as a relevant fact, and the Court will take this into account when deciding on a solution to the instant case. 48